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ABSTRACT
Over the past 2 decades, internet use has become increasingly more a part of our every-day lives.
We communicate with our friends and colleagues using the internet, we work using the internet,
we also shop using the internet. We learn and increase our knowledge from information available
on the internet. While on the one hand, we advance from the instant access to online contexts
individualistically, on the other hand we participate as members of a community for example when
we share our experiences online.
The ever growing use of the internet and its flourish in new segments of our daily life brings
significant changes not only to us, the individuals, but also to the organizations. In the past
decade, there has been a shift in the field of organizational theory considering the environment
of organizations. Current approaches extend the horizon of the classical view proclaiming that
organizational environment is not only constituted by rival organizations but also their audience
members. Several studies found evidence that audience members’ perceptions and behavior in-
fluence organizational success. For example, category-spanning organizations on average suﬀer
from social and economic disadvantages in markets because they cannot meet the expectations of
their audiences. This shift towards understanding the eﬀect of audience responses on the orga-
nizational outcome motivates my dissertation. More specifically, I study how individuals on-line
behavior aﬀects organizations. I analyze three aspects of internet mediated communication and
their consequences to the organization.
Firstly, I address the need to compare how traditional face-to-face communication compares
to the modern email communication (Chapter 2). Studies tend to take it for granted, that on-line
information exchange mirrors it’s oﬀ-line counterpart at the work place. Although, there are great
advantages in the availability of email data, as it retains communication in its completeness, it
does not fully correspond to previously studied relations, like friendship or advice seeking. The
characteristics of on-line communications also diﬀer from oﬀ-line information exchange. Employees
respect divisional and hierarchical boundaries in face-to-face conversations while these boundaries
are blurred out within the email exchange .
Secondly, I analyze a special type of on-line behavior, the on-line word-of-mouth communication
among audience members (Chapter 3). Online reviews play an increasingly important role in
shaping organizational performance. Drawing conclusions on how customers perceive quality and
typicality of a producer and how it manifests in on-line ratings increase the predictability of
producer success.
Thirdly, I approach audience behavior from a collective behavior perspective (Chapter 4).
Specifically, I analyze audience dynamics with threshold models. Doing so I address the micro
level mechanism of how audience behavior creates certain macro level patterns of producer success
rather than assuming that they are simple aggregates of individual characteristics.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
1.1.1 Attention shift to the audience members
The question as to why a producer becomes successful trails a long history in organizational re-
search. Typically scholars argued that the producer’s choices contain the key to success. Examples
of such choices are, which industry segment to enter (Schmalensee, 1985; Rumelt, 1991), whether
to enter into a highly competitive market or into a less competitive one (Carroll, 1985a), pro-
ducing single or multiple products (Hoskisson and Hitt, 1988; Teece et al., 1994), becoming a
specialist or generalist (Hannan et al., 2007b) and which other organizations to choose to enter a
into relationship with (Gulati, 1995; Powell et al., 1996; Uzzi and Lancaster, 2004).
In recent years this focus on the producer shifted towards their audience. Studies of legitimacy
showed that audience members play a key role in shaping organizations such that audience members
put pressure on the producer to conform and fulfill their shared beliefs of the product (Suchman,
1995; Zuckerman, 1999a; McKendrick and Carroll, 2001b; Hsu, 2006c). Hsu found evidence that
producers who meet the expectations of their audience are more successful (Hsu, 2006c).
This shift in the literature led to further, more detailed research on how audience perception
of the producers’ identity influences the producers’ success . These studies however mainly focus
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on a certain segment of the audience - on the critics claiming that experts as third parties of
“mediated markets” (Zuckerman, 1999a) through their distinguished role aﬀect other audience
members’ attention and evaluation patterns (Hsu, 2006c).
Critics as third parties of “mediated markets” (Zuckerman, 1999a) through their distinguished
role aﬀect other audience members’ attention and evaluation patterns (Hsu, 2006c). Zuckerman
argues that the role of a professional critic is to account for the magnitude of mismatch between
the product and its social identity. The critic perceives a product illegitimate and devalues it if the
product doesn’t fit well into the expectations of the audience. Zuckerman refers to the critics as the
primary audience whose behavior influences the secondary audience, the actual buyer’s behavior.
There has been research conducted on other domains such as the film industry (Zuckerman and
Kim, 2003; Hsu, 2006c) or French cuisine (Rao et al., 2003b, 2005) documenting similarly to
Zuckerman’s study on stock prices (Zuckerman, 1999a) that intermediaries can serve as good
estimates of producer success.
There are a few reasons however why information purely on intermediaries cannot serve as
perfect proxies of producer success. Firstly, Zuckerman and colleagues points it out that these
studies disregard the structure of the primary audience (Zuckerman et al., 2003b), the structure of
the actual buyers, which could lead to diﬀerent eﬀects. A product has to meet the expectations of
all its audience, who are coming from diﬀerent backgrounds with diﬀerent tastes, holding diﬀerent
opinions of the product in question and towards the category to which the product belongs. These
expectations can be highly similar among the audience members leading to consolidation, and, at
the other extreme, each member might hold diverse expectations (Zuckerman et al., 2003b) leading
to diﬀerent evaluation. Secondly, Critics may be pressured by both producer and audience side
(Zuckerman and Kim, 2003) and by their personal preferences or assigned medium (Zuckerman
and Kim, 2003), which further influences their evaluation. Thirdly, researches relying on data of
critics so far have not shed light on the diverging influence intermediaries have on their audience.
Zuckerman and Kim argue for example that for lowbrow movies, critics have less influence on
the audience than for highbrow films. Fourthly, there might be specific audience segments, which
do not follow intermediaries opinion and there are markets where intermediaries do not exist, for
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example on the crowdsourcing market. Finally, studies prove that intermediaries often tend to
specialize in certain categories, ignoring products in multiple categories (Zuckerman, 1999a) and
leaving the innovating attempts solely to the secondary audiences’ judgment.
Recent studies responding to this critic extend their scope to follow full audience populations.
Studies on the role of intermediaries in product success not only brought the secondary audience
in the spotlight, but also emphasized the interconnectedness of audience members’ decisions.
1.1.2 On-line behavior
A few years ago The Economist magazine (July 1999)1 wrote that “the internet (will) change
everything - the way we work, the way we learn and play, even maybe, the way we sleep.” By now,
nobody would disagree that this prediction has come true. What the Economist magazine did not
predict in 1999, however, was that computer mediated communication shapes not only everyday
behavior but it also fundamentally influences organizations.
Individual’s on-line behavior influences organizations in two aspects. Not only that internet
eliminated the geography and time constrained boundaries of communication (Duan et al., 2008),
but it also organizes individuals into loosely linked communities. Individuals communicate not
only on a personal basis, but they exchange their opinions and experience through the world wide
web.
Organizations oﬀering on-line opinion sharing services to their audience on the one hand receive
direct feedback from them, on the other hand use it as a marketing opportunity where audience
members may influence each other through word-of-mouth . Since Amazon.com customer review
system became exceedingly popular the number of business with similar services have since risen
vastly (Chevalier and Mayzlin, 2006). Websites appeared in recent years, with the sole reason to
publish reviews, for example TripAdvisor, Yelp, or Booking.com.
Access to users and buyers opinion before product purchase changed the dynamics of product
evaluation (Putsis Jr et al., 1997; Godes and Mayzlin, 2004; Salganik et al., 2006; Chevalier and
Mayzlin, 2006; Dellarocas et al., 2007; Luca, 2011b). Luca (2011b) demonstrates for example that
1http://www.economist.com/node/215657
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one star increase on the Yelp reviewer site may increase 5-9% the restaurant’s income. Chevalier
and Mayzlin (2006) finds evidence that review content influences future purchases of prospective
buyers altering the overall sale indexes. Liu (2006) shows the positive relationship between the
size of TV show audiences and online reviews. “Online user reviews have become an important
source of information to consumers, substituting and complementing other forms of business-to-
consumer and oﬄine word-of-mouth communication about product quality” argues Chevalier and
Mayzlin (2006, page 1.). The number of consumers, who pay attention to online reviews prior
to purchasing products is increasing every day. Kee (2008) finds that 68% of Internet users read
at least four reviews before product purchase (Godes and Mayzlin, 2004). BizRate questioned
5,500 on-line consumers and found that, 44% of respondents consult reviewer sites before buying
a product and even more, 59% of the respondents considered reviews written by their peers more
valuable than the ones by experts (Piller, 1999). “Online product reviews provided by consumers
who previously purchased products have become a major information source for consumers and
marketers regarding product quality”, states Hu et al. (2008, page 201.).
Although, researchers undoubtedly find correlation between performance and online reviews,
the underlying mechanism between the two is not yet clarified. On the one hand audience valuations
influence product performance, while on the other hand product performance influences audience
valuations too. Researchers studying only one side of the mechanism cannot diﬀerentiate between
weather an increase in the product performance is due to higher quality or due to the eﬀect of
social influence (Duan et al., 2008).
The appearance of reviewer sites provides the possibility on the one hand to study audience
populations (for example Hsu, 2006c; Kovacs and Johnson, 2013) to a more complete extent and
highlights the challenge and on the other hand to understand the interconnectedness of audience
behavior (Godes and Mayzlin, 2004; Chevalier and Mayzlin, 2006; Salganik et al., 2006; Salganik
and Watts, 2008; Lee and Bradlow, 2011; Zuckerman, 2012).
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1.2 Motivation
In the above section I intended to highlight the areas where audience members’ internet-mediated
communication has a direct influence on the organization. In the next part of my dissertation I
aim to answer three research questions which motivated my empirical investigations.
In the first study I argue that the rapid growth in on-line communication provides scholars with
a goldmine of available data, which allows them to map the structure of communities. However,
data from on-line sources does not reflect perfectly previously studied “oﬀ-line” relationships. I
compare oﬀ-line to on-line interactions using exponential random graph (ERG) models to under-
stand what aspect face-to-face communication approximates it’s on-line counterpart. I analyze the
roles of the two diﬀerent communication channels in reflecting organizational boundaries, organi-
zational hierarchies and gender.
Secondly, studying online reviews I investigate why producers with multiple categories re-
ceive lower ratings from reviewers than single-category producers. In the empirical investigation
I directly test and disentangle typicality-based and quality-based explanations for the negative
consequences of category spanning.
Thirdly, I analyze the interconnectedness of audience decisions of an online crowdsourcing
platform. I address the micro level mechanism of how audience behavior creates certain macro level
patterns of producer success rather than assuming that they are simple aggregates of individual
characteristics. I approach audience members’ behavior from a collective behavioral perspective.
Specifically, I analyze audience dynamics with threshold models.
1.3 Outline of the thesis
In the following sections I am going to introduce the above detailed studies in depth. Chapter 2
and Chapter 3 are based on the papers that I had published with my co-authors:
Johnson, R., Kovács, B., & Vicsek, A. (2012). A comparison of email networks and oﬀ-line
social networks: A study of a medium-sized bank. Social Networks, 34(4), 462-469.
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Kovács, B., & Johnson, R. (2013). Contrasting alternative explanations for the consequences
of category spanning: A study of restaurant reviews and menus in San Francisco. Strategic Orga-
nization, 12, 7-37.
Chapter 4 is a working paper constituted by unpublished material. In Chapter 5 I draw
general theoretical conclusions based on the three empirical studies, and propose arenas for further
research.
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Chapter 2
A comparison of email networks and
oﬀ-line social networks: A study of a
medium-sized bank*
Abstract
Recently there has been a surge in the availability of online data concerning the connections be-
tween people, and these online data are now widely used to map the social structure of communities.
There has been little research, however, on how these new types of relational data correspond to
classical measures of social networks. To fill this gap, we contrast the structure of an email network
with the underlying friendship, communication, and advice seeking networks. Our study is an ex-
plorative case study of a bank, and our data contains emails among employees and a survey of the
ego networks of the employees. Through calculating correlations with QAP standard errors and
estimating exponential random graph (ERG) models, we find that although the email network is
related to the survey-based social networks, emails networks are also significantly diﬀerent: while
oﬀ-line social networks are strongly shaped by gender, tenure, and hierarchical boundaries, the
role of these boundaries are much weaker in the email network.
——————————————————
*with Balázs Kovács and András Vicsek
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2.1 Introduction
The rapid growth in online communication provides social networks scholars with a goldmine of
data. Previously, to obtain information on the social structure of communities, researchers had
to conduct survey-based, observational, or archival research. Today, however, data on electronic
networks are readily available. This surge in data availability allows network scholars to explore the
structure of communities through emails (Grippa et al., 2006; Kleinbaum et al., 2008; Quintane
and Kleinbaum, 2008, 2011), phone logs (Eagle et al., 2010), or online collaborations (Stewart,
2005).
Relying on online data to map the structure of communities is not necessarily a straightforward
exercise. Researchers now use email networks as if they were perfect mirrors of communication (or
other) networks (e.g., Grippa et al., 2006; Kleinbaum et al., 2008). But this is assumption is ques-
tionable. Researchers need to understand how these online connections relate to previous “oﬀ-line”
measures of relations and networks (Menchik and Tian, 2008; Matzat and Snijders, 2010). This
paper provides an explorative case study, in which we compare the email network of a bank with
the corresponding self reported friendship networks, information networks, and advice networks.
This paper adds to a few existing studies on the topic. Here, we briefly overview these studies
in order to indicate how our current research extends them. Grippa et al. (2006) question the use
of email data as a proxy for traditional social network analysis. In order to understand whether
email parsing provides similar network structures as traditional social network analysis surveys do,
Grippa et al. (2006) study the communication among employees of a small graduate school and
compare network properties such as density, betweenness centrality, and core/periphery structure
of various forms of communication. They find that email networks overestimate the communication
of peers with technological expertise, but underestimate communication between the core and the
periphery. In this article, we extend Grippa and colleagues’ analyses with the inclusion of attribute
data and multiple survey-based social network data. Besides the descriptive analysis of the network,
we use exponential random graph (ERG) models to estimate when and how email networks and
networks based on traditional sociometric methods coincide or diverge.
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Quintane and Kleinbaum (2011) compare email data with survey reports on social networks,
and find that the email network corresponds to the communication network as recalled by the
participants. Although their research question is similar to ours, this paper extends their results
in two important aspects. First, the survey-based ego-network they analyze is a communication
network, while we collected network data on a wider range of relations: based on a more extensive
set of survey questions (which we shall describe later), we are able to diﬀerentiate three main
types of connections between employees: friendship, communication, and advice. We believe it
is important to have a multidimensional measure of social networks because the extent to which
emails correspond to “oﬀ-line” ties might depend largely on what kind of ties we are interested
in. Second, we would like to test their results on a larger dataset. Quintane and Kleinbaum’s
analysis of surveys is a small sample (n=23), which might be one reason why many of their ERGM
coeﬃcients are insignificant. Our dataset contains a significantly larger number of observations.
The structure of the paper is as follows. First, we describe the empirical setting and the network
data in detail, with emphasis on how we collected and transformed the variables and with a detailed
discussion on the issue of missing observations. Second, we provide descriptive statistics on the
networks and compare the networks using network correlations. Third, we estimate exponential
random graph models on the networks, and compare what mechanisms drive the email, friendship,
advice, and communication networks. Finally, we discuss the findings and their implications for
research in social networks, and communications.
2.2 Data
We collected our data from a Central European bank. The dataset contains attribute information
about the employees, email messages among the employees, and a sociometric survey. The company
provided us attribute information about all employees who worked at the headquarters of the firm
at the time of data collection (N=1,311), such as gender, job function, tenure, age and hierarchical
level. The company also provided us the email activity of these employees for a three-week period.
We conducted a sociometric survey, which was completed by 761 employees (overall response rate:
11
57%).
For purposes of this analysis, we select a subsample of the data. In order to minimize the
possible biases from missing data (Holland and Leinhardt, 1973; Kossinets, 2006), we selected
the three organizational departments with the highest response rates on the sociometric survey1.
There is no missing data on the attributes of the employees and on the emails. The average
response rate in these three departments is 67% (out of 168 employees in the three departments,
113 completed the survey). Table 2.1 contains the descriptive statistics of the sample, and compares
the set of respondents with all the employees of these three departments. As the table shows, the
characteristics of the respondents closely match the characteristics of the non-respondents (this
and following results are based on chi-squared tests of proportion under multinomial sampling
assumptions). We also check whether the three chosen departments are typical departments of the
bank in terms of age, gender, tenure, and hierarchical composition. Table 2.1 illustrates that the
three chosen departments do not diﬀer significantly along most attributes of the employees from the
population of all departments. The only exception is gender distribution: males are overrepresented
in one of the three highest response-rate departments (the department with the second highest
response rate happens to be the IT department, and males are traditionally overrepresented in
IT departments). There is no gender bias in response rate within the departments, however.
Therefore, although the response rate is the selected sample is only 67%, due to the fact that
the sample matches the population on the main attributes, we have no reason to believe that
non-response biases our model estimates2.
The mean age of employees in our sample is 32 years; the mean tenure is 3.7 years; 34 em-
ployees were hired within one year; the longest tenure is 15 years. The employees in the analyzed
departments are all located in the same building (which is important in the light of Marmaros and
1When deciding how many of the highest response rate departments to include into the analysis, we had to
balance two opposing criteria: on one hand, by including more departments in the sample we would increase the
number of observations; on the other hand, including more departments decreases the overall response rate, which
we wanted to avoid. Eventually, we decided to include the three departments with the highest response rates
because this sample provides a relatively large number of observations and at the same time keeps the response rate
relatively high.
2We also investigated whether ERG estimates are biased, but our analyses (not shown here) do not indicate the
presence of a strong bias.
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Sacerdote (2006) and Kleinbaum et al. (2008) who both find that geographical distance plays a
crucial role in emailing behavior).
Sociometric data. We conducted the sociometric survey in July 2007. To map the egocentric
networks of employees, we sent all the employees an email inquiring as to whether they would
be interested in participating in our study. Included in the email was a direct link to the on-line
survey. Respondents were presented with a list of all the members of the company, and were
asked to select the names of their contacts. Respondents could select among the names in two
ways: either by choosing directly from all the names using a drop-down list or by first selecting
the department of the employee and then selecting the name from a list which contains only the
employees of the selected department.
In the survey, we used traditional egocentric questions to map the friendship, advice, and
information flow networks. This technique has a long history in network studies, communication
research, and organizational studies (Moreno, 1933; Sampson, 1988; Podolny and Baron, 1997;
Morrison, 2002; Goodreau, 2007). For each of the friendship, advice, and information flow networks
we asked two questions, and we created a tie between ego and alter if ego named alter in any of
the questions along the respective dimension. For example, if ego listed alter in either Question 3
(“Which of your colleagues do you believe have the most professional knowledge or expertise?”) or
Question 4 (“Which of your colleagues do you turn to for professional advice?”), then the advice
seeking network is set to have a tie between ego and alter. See Table 2.2 for the survey questions
(the survey contained other questions as well, but these questions are not directly relevant to
our research question so we do not analyze them here). Note that these networks are directed.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the friendship, advice seeking and information flow networks. One might
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Figure 2.1: Visualization of the all email, friendship, advice seeking, and information flow networks.
For easier comparison, we forced the same layout on the networks. Diﬀerent colors represent the
diﬀerent organizational departments; squares denote male employees and circles denote female
employees.
a) friendship network
b) advice network
15
c) information flow network
d) email network
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Table 2.2: Survey questions
Survey questions
Friendship network
1. Which of your colleagues would you turn to for advice with personal
problems?
2. Which of your colleagues do you like to have lunch with?
Advice network
3. Which of your colleagues do you believe has the most professional
knowledge or expertise?
4. Which of your colleagues do you turn to for professional advice?
Information flow network
5. Through informal channels, from which of your colleagues do you most
quickly gain information concerning company news or organizational changes?
6. Through formal channels, from which of your colleagues do you most
quickly gain information about the company?
argue that the research design, which, as described above, is a fixed-choice design, might introduce
selection bias into our analyses as it censors the data (Holland and Leinhardt, 1973; Kossinets,
2006). While we agree that the research design is not optimal, we believe that in this case censoring
does not alter the results significantly: For each sociometric question the employees could have
listed up to four names, but they rarely listed the maximum four. In 42% of the answers only one
alter was listed, in 37% of the answers two alters were listed, in 17% three alters, and only in 4%
of the answers were all the four possible slots used. As only in these latter cases might censoring
matter, we argue that censoring does not pose a serious problem.
Email data. The subsample we analyze includes the complete record of email activity among
the 113 employees during an observation period of roughly three weeks. To protect the privacy of
employees, the bank omitted the subject and the content of the messages, providing us only with
information about the senders and recipients, the length of the email, the time and the date the
message was sent. The names of employees were replaced with identifiers. Our sample contains
6,551 emails among the 113 employees.
Operationalizing the email networks. How should one build a network from data on email
communications? The answer to this question is less than obvious. In short, one needs to opera-
tionalize what a tie is: should we consider two people A and B connected if there exists an email
from A to B, or should we require say at least five emails? Should we include emails with multiple
17
recipients (just think about whether a mass-email with 50 recipients represent a tie)? Should we
consider a tie to exist between two persons if person A has cc-d person B in a single email but
there is no other email from A to B? Because the literature provides no clear guidance on these
issues, we investigate multiple operationalizations. Exploring multiple operationalizations on one
hand ensures the robustness of our analyses, and on the other hand provides a reference for further
researchers who aim at extracting networks from email communications.
To tackle the issue of operationalization of emails, we take an approach that mixes conceptual
insights and sensitivity analyses. The first operationalization, which we call all-email network,
defines a tie between ego and alter if there had been any email communications from alter to ego.
This operationalization, we think, is a natural choice. In the second operationalization, we aimed
to exclude ties between employees who only have mass-email communication to each other – the
reason for this was the intuition that if only mass-emails exist between two employees then they
are probably not connected. To identify mass-emails, Quintane and Kleinbaum (2011) selected
emails with four or more recipients. As we find their cut-oﬀ at four recipients arbitrary, we have
conducted sensitivity analyses: we explored how the networks change if we vary the cut-oﬀs (for
brevity, results are not shown here). These sensitivity analyses show that the natural cut-oﬀ is not
at four recipients but at two: whether there exists an individual email between ego and alter (in
which alter is the only recipient). Thus, we analyze the network of individual emails. This network,
although emerged from sensitivity analyses, can also be defended conceptually, as person-to-person
emails are qualitatively diﬀerent from emails that have more than one recipient.
In the third operationalization, we create an email network in which a tie is defined to exist
between alter an ego if ego sent at least four emails to alter. This operationalization emerged from
the consideration to create an email-based network that has similar density to the survey-based
networks (this is important in view of Anderson et al. (1999), who show how estimates of network
parameters interact with the density of the network). After calculating the average degree for
networks emerging from diﬀerent cut-oﬀ values, we found that the network with four email cut-oﬀ
has an average degree of 2.06 which is closest to the average degree of the friendship-, advice-, and
information flow networks (see Table 2.3).
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Table 2.3: Density of the networks and network correlations with QAP standard errors
Number of edges Average degree
All emails network 2,091 18.50
Individual emails network 1,221 10.81
Individual emails network (weight > 4) 233 2.06
Friendship network 251 2.21
Advice network 272 2.41
Information network 182 1.61
All possible edges 12,656
Network Correlations 2 3 4 5 6
1 All emails network 0.735 0.308 0.272 0.248 0.230
2 Individual emails network 0.419 0.261 0.249 0.253
3 Individual emails network (weight > 4) 0.280 0.280 0.309
4 Friendship network 0.354 0.345
5 Advice network 0.348
6 Information flow network
All correlations are significant at the 0.01 level (standard errors calculated with QAP).
2.3 Analyses: Comparison of survey-base and email-based
social networks
2.3.1 Network correlations and descriptive statistics of the networks
Before turning to the analysis of the networks with exponential random graph models, we provide
some descriptive statistics about the macro structure of the networks and the overall correspon-
dence between the networks. First, we compare the networks using network correlations with
standard errors calculated with Krackardt (1987)’s Quadratic Assignment Procedure (QAP). The
network correlation coeﬃcients, all of which are significant at the 0.01 level, are shown in Table 2.3.
The networks correlate positively, although the strengths of the correlations are moderate: The
survey-based networks have a correlation of around 0.35 with each other, and a 0.25 correlation
with the email-based networks.
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2.3.2 Comparison of the networks along centrality measures
After analyzing the networks with network correlations, in this section we compare the networks
along structural properties such as degree centrality, betweenness centrality and closeness centrality
(Wasserman and Faust, 1994; Grippa et al., 2006). Here we investigate whether centrality in
email-based networks correspond to centrality and brokerage in the friendship, advice seeking, and
information flow networks.
We calculate actors’ degree centrality (the number of connections the individual has) for each
network, as well as closeness and betweenness centrality (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). Similarly
to Kossinets and Watts (2006), we calculate Spearman‘s rank order correlation to compare the
structural position of actors in the diﬀerent networks.
Table 2.4 shows a number of interesting correlations, but here we focus on whether the email-
based networks correspond to the friendship, advice seeking, and information flow networks in
terms of actors’ centrality positions. Two general patterns are apparent. First, email networks
have stronger correlations with the advice seeking and the information flow network in terms of
centrality than with friendship networks. Indeed, some of the correlations are rather high (e.g.,
0.642), indicating that being central in the email network corresponds to being central in the
advice and information flow networks. Second, while centrality in email networks corresponds to
centrality in oﬀ-line network in terms of betweenness- and degree-centrality, this does not hold for
closeness centrality. Unfortunately we do not have any explanation for this finding.
2.3.3 Analyzing the networks with Exponential Random Graphs
The network correlations with QAP standard errors demonstrate that although the email-based
and the survey-based networks are related, they diﬀer substantially. Correlation is, however, just
a crude measure of correspondence. To get at a more detailed comparison of the various networks,
we turn to Exponential Random Graph models (Handcock, 2002; Hunter, 2007; Goodreau, 2007;
Pattison and Robins, 2007). We choose this model family because it enables the comparison
of the mechanisms and factors that explain the various social network data, and it allows for
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Table 2.4: Spearman Correlations among Centrality Measures of the Employees
Betweenness centrality
2 3 4 5 6
Spearman Correlation
1 All emails network 0.883*** 0.454*** 0.341*** 0.551*** 0.455***
2 Individual emails network 0.441*** 0.331*** 0.508*** 0.426***
3 Individual emails network (weight>4) 0.171* 0.450*** 0.472***
4 Friendship network 0.387*** 0.247***
5 Advice network 0.384***
6 Information flow network
***.Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
**.Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
*.Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed).
(N=113; max.num.edge=12,656)
Closeness centrality
2 3 4 5 6
Spearman Correlation
1 All emails network 0.278*** 0.132 -0.034 0.296*** 0.126
2 Individual emails network 0.097 -0.068 0.308*** 0.046
3 Individual emails network (weight>4) -0.012 0.369*** 0.378***
4 Friendship network -0.107 0.335***
5 Advice network 0.324***
6 Information flow network
***.Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
**.Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
*.Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed).
(N=113; max.num.edge=12,656)
Degree centrality
2 3 4 5 6
Spearman Correlation
1 All emails network 0.888*** 0.595*** 0.400*** 0.518*** 0.642***
2 Individual emails network 0.583*** 0.346*** 0.448*** 0.597***
3 Individual emails network (weight>4) 0.345*** 0.393*** 0.574***
4 Friendship network 0.450*** 0.534***
5 Advice network 0.572***
6 Information flow network
***.Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
**.Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
*.Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed).
(N=113; max.num.edge=12,656)
21
simultaneously investigating the eﬀects of node attributes, dyad attributes, and local network
configurations (Handcock, 2002; Hunter, 2007; Goodreau, 2007; Pattison and Robins, 2007). Our
research strategy entails modeling each network individually, and comparing the modeling results
across the networks.
Exponential random graph models have the following form:
Pr (X = x) = exp (
P
A  AzA (x)) /,
where A is a subset of tie variables, defining a potential network configuration,  A is a model
parameter corresponding to the configuration A (and is non-zero only if all pairs of variables in A
are assumed to be conditionally dependent); zA(x) is the suﬃcient statistic corresponding to the
parameter  A and indicates the number of configurations A occurring in the network x; and  is
a normalizing quantity (Pattison and Robins, 2007).
In the models we present, we incorporate both endogenous local network structure variables and
attribute variables. The local network structure variables include: density, reciprocity, indegree
and outdegree distribution3, and transitivity. As for attributes, we incorporate hierarchy, gender,
tenure, age, and information on whether the two employees in the dyad are in the same department.
As the network is directed, we include a dummy of whether the sender is at higher hierarchy level
than the receiver, or they are at the same hierarchy level (therefore, the baseline is when the
receiver is at higher hierarchy level). Similarly, we add dummies for the dyadic gender eﬀect,
where the baseline is the female-female dyad. As both tenure and age are continuous variables, we
included the absolute diﬀerence along tenure and age into the model (tenure and age are coded in
decades).
Before discussing the specific models, we note that we have calculated a wide range of models
with alternative specifications, but here for brevity we only show and discuss a few of them. We
selected those models that are parsimonious but also have good fit: the models simulated based
on the estimates fit the empirical networks well in terms of indegree-, outdegree, edge-wise shared
3Note that to model some of the networks, we needed to include two geometrically-weighted indegree and
outdegree terms with diﬀerent parameters. This is standard practice in modeling networks with bimodal degree
distributions. Note that this explains the seemingly high coeﬃcients of gwidegree, gwodegree, and edges in these
models.
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Table 2.5: Result of the ERG models for the survey-based networks
Friendship network Advice network Information flow network
Edges -5.829 (0.117) -578.800 (0.087) -3.100 (0.095)
Reciprocity 2.935 (0.230) 1.733 (0.404) 1.474 (0.314)
Geom. w. in-degree, a=ln(2) -0.497 (0.106) -3.933 (0.064) -3.616 (0.646)
Geom. w. out-degree, a=ln(2) 0.227 (0.046)
Geom. w. out-degree, a=ln(2.5) -53.130 (0.041)
Geom. w. out-degree, a=ln(3) -3.137 (0.118)
Geom. w. out-degree, a=ln(5) 628.300 (0.037)
Cyclic Triples -0.230 (0.010)
Transitive Triples 0.911 (0.044)
Hierarchy (high->low) 0.942 (0.059) 0.923 (0.046) 1.293 (0.066)
Hierarchy same 0.498 (0.035) 0.764 (0.038) 0.827 (0.020)
Male to Male -0.303 (0.038) -0.683 (0.040) -0.503 (0.022)
Female to Male -0.604 (0.080) -0.469 (0.115) -0.518 (0.070)
Male to Female -0.414 (0.079) -0.986 (0.077) -0.516 (0.054)
AbsdiﬀTenure -0.018 (0.007) -0.001 (0.007) -0.010 (0.003)
AbsdiﬀAge -0.010 (0.004) -0.006 (0.003) -0.014 (0.002)
Same department 2.889 (0.032) 3.715 (0.040) 5.322 (0.015)
Isolates 0.662 (2.122)
Parameter values of the erg models; (N=113; max.num.edges=12,656) Standard errors are in parentheses.
partner, and triad-census distributions (Hunter et al., 2008). It is important to stress that our
main findings hold across alternative model specifications.
2.3.4 Results of the exponential random graph models
Before discussing the individual parameter estimates, we have to note that in accordance with
the network correlation results in the previous section, there is an overall positive correspondence
between the email and survey-based networks in the sense that the signs of the coeﬃcients are
mostly the same. Besides an overall similarity, however, there are important diﬀerences as well.
Tables 2.5 and 2.6 show the model estimates4. First, we discuss the results for reciprocity.
While reciprocity is present in all the networks, its strength varies. Reciprocity is very important
in the email and the friendship networks. For example, if ego sent an email to alter, then the
probability that alter sends an email to ego increases 24 times (exp(3.158)). Similarly, if an ego
4We estimated the ERG models with the Statnet package in R (Handcock et al., 2011)
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Table 2.6: Result of the ERG models for three diﬀerent operationalizations of the email data
Network of all emails Network of individual emails Network of individual
emails (weight>=4)
Edges 13.410 (0.125) 191.700 (0.236) -3.942 (0.124)
Reciprocity 2.825 (0.327) 3.158 (0.233) 4.414 (0.306)
Geom. w. in-degree, a=ln(2) 0.175 (0.537) -2.241 (0.044)
Geom. w. in-degree, a=ln(3) 1.004 (0.280)
Geom. w. in-degree, a=ln(5) -8.737 (0.002)
Geom. w. in-degree, a=ln(7) -115.400 (0.003)
Geom. w. out-degree, a=ln(2) -1.351 (0.102) -2.018 (0.046)
Geom. w. out-degree, a=ln(3) -1.298 (0.004)
Geom. w. out-degree, a=ln(5) -10.930 (0.003)
Geom. w. out-degree, a=ln(7) -83.120 (0.003)
Hierarchy (high->low) 0.817 (0.007) 0.401 (0.014) 0.986 (0.048)
Hierarchy same 0.546 (0.002) 0.396 (0.005) 0.416 (0.035)
Male to Male 0.039 (0.003) 0.111 (0.006) -0.295 (0.038)
Female to Male -0.102 (0.007) -0.062 (0.014) -0.008 (0.064)
Male to Female 0.200 (0.006) 0.222 (0.013) -0.094 (0.060)
AbsdiﬀTenure -0.023 (0.001) -0.018 (0.001) 0.039 (0.004)
AbsdiﬀAge -0.005 (0.000) -0.002 (0.001) -0.040 (0.003)
Same department 2.040 (0.004) 2.354 (0.003) 2.788 (0.021)
Isolates -0.870 (0.099)
Parameter values of the erg models (N=113; max.num.edges=12,656) Standard errors are in parentheses.
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nominates alter as friend, then the chance that alter nominates ego as friend is 19 times higher
(exp(2.935)). Weaker is the eﬀect of reciprocity in the information flow network and in the advice
network (which is not surprising, as advice ties are often asymmetric).
Now we turn to analyze the role of organizational boundaries in shaping the interpersonal net-
works. It is apparent that being in the same organizational department dramatically increases the
probability that two employees will interact by email or nominate each other in the friendship,
advice seeking, or information flow networks (this is also apparent from Figure 2.1). The strongest
is the eﬀect for the information flow network, in which being in the same department increases the
chance of a tie between two employees by almost two hundred times (exp(5.322)). More moderate
but still strong is the eﬀect of being in the same department for the advice seeking and friendship
networks (the estimated coeﬃcients are 3.72 and 2.89). Much weaker (but still significant) is the
eﬀect of departmental boundaries on emailing behavior. This finding indicates that studies that
purely rely on email networks to investigate the eﬀects of organizational boundaries on interper-
sonal networks and communications, such as Kleinbaum et al. (2008), underestimate the role of
boundaries.
Organizational hierarchy also shapes oﬀ-line social networks stronger than it shapes email
networks. While both emails and friendship, advice seeking and information flow nominations
tend to be directed toward the same and lower levels of hierarchy (as viewed from ego’s location),
the eﬀect size of hierarchy variables is higher for oﬀ-line networks (except in the case of email ties
in which ego sent at least four individual emails to alter, but as this network signals stronger ties,
this result is not surprising).
Gender plays a diﬀerent role in the email and oﬀ-line social networks. While in the oﬄine
networks the female-female ties are the most likely, followed by male-male ties, the overall eﬀect
of gender on email networks is rather weak and inconsistent across operationalizations.
In summary, we have found that on one hand reciprocity plays a stronger role in email net-
works than oﬀ-line social network; on the other hand, oﬀ-line social networks are more influenced
by organizational, gender, and hierarchical diﬀerences (we provide possible explanation for these
findings later).
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Table 2.7: Result of the ERG models for the email networks, with the friendship, advice, and
information flow networks as covariates
Network of all emails Network of individual emails Network of individual
emails (weight>=4)
Edges 12.970 (0.103) 25.650 (0.021) 28.590 (0.004)
Reciprocity 3.161 (0.255) 3.023 (0.053) 3.873 (0.007)
Geom. w. in-degree, a=ln(2) 0.377 (0.597) 0.879 (0.057) -0.978 (0.017)
Geom. w. in-degree, a=ln(5) -8.796 (0.004) -16.310 (0.001) -13.880 (0.000)
Geom. w. out-degree, a=ln(2) -1.668 (0.060) -0.318 (0.013) 0.083 (0.005)
Geom. w. out-degree, a=ln(5) -10.460 (0.001) -16.800 (0.001) -21.290 (0.000)
Hierarchy (high->low) 0.736 (0.005) 0.252 (0.003) 0.524 (0.002)
Hierarchy same 0.489 (0.001) 0.343 (0.001) 0.229 (0.000)
Male to Male 0.079 (0.002) 0.143 (0.001) -0.415 (0.001)
Female to Male -0.012 (0.005) 0.023 (0.003) 0.042 (0.002)
Male to Female 0.279 (0.005) 0.307 (0.002) 0.001 (0.002)
AbsdiﬀTenure -0.032 (0.000) -0.019 (0.000) 0.038 (0.000)
AbsdiﬀAge -0.015 (0.000) -0.006 (0.000) -0.066 (0.000)
Same department 1.984 (0.003) 2.259 (0.002) 2.416 (0.001)
Friendship Network 1.609 (0.173) 1.012 (0.045) 1.527 (0.019)
Advice Network 0.537 (0.177) 0.663 (0.037) 1.411 (0.019)
Information flow Network 1.030 (0.322) 0.852 (0.055) 1.308 (0.030)
Parameter values of the erg models (N=113; max.num.edges=12,656) Standard errors are in parentheses.
2.3.5 Can emailing behavior be explained with oﬀ-line social networks?
Why do people write emails? Although carefully answering this question would require the analysis
of the content of the emails (which we do not have), the data at hand allows us to take a few steps
toward understanding how oﬀ-line relations explain who writes email to whom. To keep consistency
with our previous modeling approaches, we take the simplest approach to investigating how oﬀ-
line networks explain emailing behavior: we include friendship, advice, and information flow ties
as explanatory variables into the ERG models of Table 2.6. We expect these variables to have
positive coeﬃcients: an employee is more likely to write email to a friend, more likely to write
email to whom she turns for advice, etc. We are interested in two things: first, which of these
oﬀ-line relationships is the most important in explaining emailing behavior; and second, to what
extent does including oﬀ-line relationships into the models help explaining emailing behavior.
Table 2.7 shows the ERG estimates for all previous email network operationalizations. First,
as expected, the existence of a friendship, advice, or information flow relationship between ego
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and alter increases the probability that ego will write an email to alter. This finding is consistent
across all three email-network operationalizations. Also consistent across operationalizations is
that friendship relations are the most important in explaining the existence of emails from ego to
alter. Second most important in two out of the three networks is the information flow relationship,
except in the network of four or more individual emails, in which case advice is the second most
important (this finding is not surprising as this is the network that mirrors the most frequent
emails). These findings, we believe, are novel to the email and communication literatures.
Second, the results in Table 2.7 show that oﬀ-line relationships have strong explanatory power.
On one hand, existence of a friendship tie increases the chance of an email, ceteris paribus, by
5 times (exp (1.609)). This magnitude makes it the most important determinant, together with
reciprocity and being in the same department. Also, by incorporating friendship, advice, and infor-
mation flow relationships as covariates, the fit of the models improves significantly. Note, however,
that the strong structural eﬀects remain, which indicating that there are social mechanisms at
work on top of (the main eﬀect of) friendship, advice, and information networks.
In summary, we can say that consistent with the previous results in the paper, the results of
Table 2.7 demonstrate that while emailing behavior is strongly influenced by oﬀ-line relations, oﬀ-
line relations do not explain emailing behavior perfectly. (This latter statement should be taken
with caution, as we do not claim that there exists no model that explains emails. For example, we
could include interactions between the variables etc. These we leave for future research.) What
these analyses add, however, is that they demonstrate that friendship is the factor that most
strongly drives the overall patterns of emailing, as opposed to advice seeking, or information flow
(even though these factors are present as well).
2.3.6 Possible explanations for the findings
What might be the explanations for our empirical findings, namely that while there is a general
correspondence between the email networks and oﬀ-line social networks, this correspondence is
not perfect, and social, hierarchical, and gender boundaries are less important in email networks?
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In general, there could be two answers. The first possible explanation for the divergence between
survey-based and email-based social networks concerns a measurement issue: surveys are self-
reported, while emails are observational. There is extensive literature in the fields of social networks
and communications regarding the diﬀerences between self-reported and observed ties (Killworth
and Bernard, 1976; Bernard et al., 1982; Brewer, 2000; Marin, 2004; Marsden, 2005). This literature
mostly focuses on “recall-bias,” i.e., that people cannot perfectly recall their ties to others. A
general finding in the recall literature is that people are better in recalling stable and frequent
relations (Freeman et al., 1987). Also, Brewer (2000) finds that people are better in recalling
alters who are more centrally located in the network. This literature, however, tends to agree
that there exists no good general predictors of whom ego will forget to recall, in terms of gender,
status, or age diﬀerences (for example, Bernard et al. (1982) did not find any strong eﬀect of
these variables on whom people recall as a communication partner). These findings, thus, do not
help in understanding the systematic diﬀerences we found between the email and the survey-based
networks.
A second possible explanation for our findings is that online and oﬄine relations are just
simply diﬀerent. As Susan Herring writes, “the Internet is said to be inherently democratic,
leveling traditional distinctions of social status” (Herring, 2003, page 202.) While this is a slightly
utopian statement, scholars have reported that perceived hierarchies, organizational boundaries,
gender and age diﬀerences are less important in online settings (Wellman and Hampton, 1999).
Interestingly, while there exists a sizable literature in the field of communication on how people
use email, relatively few studies analyze empirically the eﬀect of gender or status diﬀerences in
emailing behavior (but see Boneva et al., 2001; Herring, 2003). These studies, using very diﬀerent
research approaches from ours (Boneva et al. (2001) uses survey data on internet usage), find
similar results: females write more emails than males (Herring, 2003). Although these scholars
observe a general tendency of online behavior to decrease the importance of oﬀ-line diﬀerences in
gender, power, or age, a general agreement in the field is that these diﬀerences albeit decrease but
do not go away.
In general, it is hard to come to a strong conclusion for the observed patterns, especially because
28
survey networks and the email networks in our paper diﬀer in both the recall/observational and
the on/oﬀ-line dimensions. It would be an interesting way for future research to compare networks
that diﬀer in only one of these dimensions. An important step toward that direction is Matzat
and Snijders (2010), who experimentally compare oﬀ- and on-line collected recall data.
2.4 Discussion
In this paper, we analyzed the structure of an email network and the underlying friendship, com-
munication, and advice seeking networks. Our sample contains detailed email communications
of 113 employees of three departments of a bank, and of a survey of the ego networks of these
employees. Our goal was to understand the extent to which email patterns coincide with socio-
metric measures of the friendship, advice seeking, and communication networks. To study these
questions, we used exponential random graph models along with structural analyses.
In general, our results demonstrate that although the structure of the email networks in our
dataset is related to the structure of survey-based networks, emails networks and survey-based
social networks do not perfectly correspond to each other. On one hand, email-based and survey-
based social networks do coincide in many aspects. For example, email networks are relatively
good in predicting the betweenness and degree centrality of employees, especially in the advice
seeking and communication networks.
In many other aspects, however, email-based and survey-based social networks diverge. For
example, if one is interested in the role organizational boundaries play in forming social networks,
the two data types paint markedly diﬀerent pictures. In the email-based networks, organizational
boundaries play a weaker role (Namata et al., 2006) and email communication often moves across
boundaries. The sociometric data, however, indicate that these boundaries do play a role, a
role that is much stronger than pictured by email networks. This result questions the validity
of Kleinbaum et al. (2008)’s finding that gender and hierarchical boundaries are not as strong
as geographical boundaries - while these results may be valid, our results indicate that emails
underestimate the role of organizational boundaries. Also, email networks do not capture the role
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organizational hierarchies and gender play in interpersonal networks.
Finally, we have to note that this paper is an explorative case-study of a single organization.
Although we do not see any reason why this setting would be atypical, we believe that more work
needs to be done to proper understand the relationship between email networks and oﬀ-line social
networks. First, for the sake of generalizability, other organizations and empirical settings should
be studied. Second, although in order to minimize the amount of missing data we chose the three
departments with the highest response rates, we still have 33% of missing observations, which
might bias our findings (but see our arguments about why we think that non-response bias is not
strong in our sample). Third, future research is needed to analyze the content of emails: this would
enable researchers to diﬀerentiate between friendship, advice seeking, or communication emails.
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Chapter 3
Contrasting alternative explanations for the
consequences of category spanning: A
study of restaurant reviews and menus in
San Francisco*
Abstract
Recent literature on organizational category spanning demonstrates that organizations that span
multiple categories on average suﬀer social and economic disadvantages in markets. While multiple
mechanisms have been proposed to explain this finding, most studies do not test directly nor
contrast these mechanisms. In this paper, we contrast two of the main mechanisms proposed in the
literature: the audience-side typicality-based explanation (category spanners are atypical of each
categories spanned) and the producer-side quality-based explanation (category spanners produce
lower quality output because they cannot develop expertise in any of the categories spanned). We
find evidence for both mechanisms. Furthermore, we argue that quality and typicality interact
such that high-quality organizations can benefit from being atypical. Finally, we contrast two
kinds of spanning: “fusion” and “food court,” and argue that their eﬀects are diﬀerent depending
on the overall quality of the organization. Our empirical setting is the restaurant domain, and we
analyze menus and reviews of 474 restaurants located in San Francisco.
—————————–
*with Balázs Kovács
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3.1 Introduction
An active line of contemporary research on organizations investigates the eﬀects of category span-
ning on organizational outcomes. A now accepted empirical pattern shows that organizations
that span multiple categories on average suﬀer from social and economic disadvantage in markets.
Category spanners receive less attention and legitimacy and they have lower chances of success
(Zuckerman, 1999a; Zuckerman and Kim, 2003; Hsu et al., 2009b). Organizations assigned to
multiple categories tend to be either ignored (Zuckerman, 1999a) or devalued (Pólos et al., 2002b;
Rao et al., 2003b; Hsu, 2006c; Kovacs and Hannan, 2010, 2011). This pattern is shown to hold
in domains such as stock recommendation (Zuckerman, 1999a), films (Zuckerman and Kim, 2003;
Hsu, 2006c), wine producers (Negro et al., 2010b, 2011), online auctions (Hsu et al., 2009b), and
restaurant reviews (Kovacs and Hannan, 2010).
Although researchers studying category spanning have put forward an impressive set of empir-
ical findings over the last decades, the theoretical underpinnings of these findings are not clarified,
and a number of diﬀerent theoretical processes have been advanced to explain the consequences of
category spanning. The explanations proposed by organizational theorists mainly fall in two areas,
which we term the “quality-based” and the “socio-cognitive-based” explanations. The quality-based
explanations relate to the producer-side consequences of category spanning and explore the eﬀects
of spanning on the quality of the oﬀerings of organizations. The socio-cognitive explanations fo-
cus on the audience-side consequences of spanning. One socio-cognitive explanation argues that
category spanners violate institutionalized expectations and thus are viewed illegitimate (Zucker-
man, 1999a). Another approach focuses on the confusion and ambiguity stemming from category
spanning: category spanning confuses audience members who do not know what to expect from
these organizations (Hsu, 2006c; Hsu et al., 2009b; Kovacs and Hannan, 2010, 2011). A mechanism
emphasized here is typicality: organizations that span multiple categories are atypical to each of
the categories spanned, thus audience members cannot rely on category schemata to form clear
expectations about the oﬀerings of the organizations (Hsu et al., 2009b; Negro et al., 2010b; Kovacs
and Hannan, 2011).
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While researchers are aware that quality-based and socio-cognitive-based explanations could
be confounded (Zuckerman, 1999a; Zuckerman and Kim, 2003; Hsu, 2006c; Hsu et al., 2009b),
there has been little attempt to test the mechanisms directly1, nor have researchers put forward
an empirical analysis in which multiple alternative mechanisms are contrasted. There is a need
to open the “black box” of the consequences of spanning in order to identify the mechanisms that
cause them. In most above-mentioned articles, one (or more) of the mechanisms is emphasized
to derive macro level consequences, and the tests operate on the macro level consequences. In
this paper, we contrast the typicality-based and the quality-based mechanisms. Getting at the
mechanisms is important not merely for theoretical purposes but because diﬀerent mechanisms
have distinct implications. For example, the quality-based and the typicality-based explanations
provide diﬀerent predictions for quality-category organizations: the quality argument would not
diﬀerentiate among single-category organizations, while the typicality-based argument predicts
that single-category organizations that are atypical to their category have lower value than single-
category organizations that are typical to the category they are in. The diﬀerent mechanisms
also provide diverging recommendations for organizational action: if the locus of punishment
lies in the audience side (Zuckerman, 1999a; Hsu, 2006c), then organizations need to focus on
audiences’ perceptions to dodge the negative consequences of spanning. If the mechanism is on the
producer side and involves reduction in skills and capabilities, then organizations need to assess
the relatedness of skills and technologies before they decide to span categories.
Our empirical setting is restaurants and restaurant reviewing. In short, we investigate whether
restaurants that span categories (such as “Japanese” and “Mexican”) receive lower ratings from
reviewers. The review data come from the online review website Yelp.com. We collected reviews
between January 2010 and October 2011. The sample consists of 59,605 reviews written about
474 San Francisco-based restaurants by 32,624 unique reviewers. These data have been used
previously in Kovacs and Hannan (2010) and Kovacs and Hannan (2011), who demonstrate that
restaurants that span categories receive lower ratings. However, the two papers by Kovács and
1With the major exceptions of Hsu (2006c) and Negro and Leung (2013), which we discuss later. We shall also
discuss research on diversification in strategy.
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Hannan, as most other papers in the field, suﬀer from two shortcomings: they do not measure
the typicality of restaurants but assume that multiple-category restaurants are less typical than
single category restaurants; and they do not control for the alternative, skill- or quality-based
mechanisms. To further their results, in this paper we collect and analyze two additional data
sources: to assess typicality, we collected the menus of the restaurants in our sample. To assess
quality, we collected the “food” quality scores of The Zagat Guide, which has previously been
used as a measure of restaurant quality (Roberts et al., 2013). Combining these two additional
data sources with the review data allows us to directly test and disentangle typicality-based and
quality-based explanations for the negative consequences of category spanning.
A main novelty of this paper is a direct instrument of typicality. Previous research assessed
typicality indirectly, and assumed that the more categories an organization populates, the lower
its typicality in each of the categories populated (Hsu, 2006c; Kovacs and Hannan, 2010; Negro
et al., 2010b). For example, a restaurant that is labeled both “Japanese” and “Mexican” is likely to
be atypical of both categories. While we are sympathetic to this approach, here we argue that a
more direct instrumentation of typicality is needed. First, approaches that use multiple category
membership, in lack of better evidence, have to assume that single-category organizations are all
typical to their category. This is clearly an oversimplification. For example, not all single-category
“Italian” restaurants are 100% typical Italian. As single-category organizations are prevalent (for
example, they constitute almost half of our sample), dealing with them is crucial to test the theory2.
Second, not all multiple category organizations violate the “categorical imperative” to the same
extent: for restaurants, an “Indian” and “Pakistani” combination is likely to be less detrimental
than an “Indian” and “Japanese” combination. To account for such cases, ideally one needs to
examine the actual oﬀering of the organizations3.
Our empirical strategy to assess the typicality of restaurants is to contrast the oﬀering of the
2Note that in Zuckerman (1999:1418)’s Table 2, single-category organizations also constitute about half of the
population (11 out of 20).
3An alternative approach is to take into account the structure of the category system. The only paper we know
that attempts this is Kovacs and Hannan (2011), who use the organizational categories’ co-occurrences to infer the
structure of the category system. While this is a step in the right direction, it does not deal with the single-category
organizations problem.
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restaurant (items on the menu) with its labels (Italian, Japanese, etc.) and assess the extent to
which the menu fits the label(s) the restaurant claims. We use a commonly utilized computational
linguistics approach, word-category co-location mapping (Manning and Schütze, 1999b), to explore
the schemata of organizational categories. We establish the typicality of the restaurants in the
categories by comparing the restaurant’s oﬀering to the schemata of the categories. We assert that
the category mismatch of a restaurant is high when the oﬀerings are atypical of the label(s) to
which it is assigned. To our knowledge, ours is the first paper in the category spanning literature
that actually measures the oﬀerings of the organizations and assesses typicality in such a way.
Besides contrasting the two main mechanisms for the eﬀects of category spanning on the average
eﬀect of category spanning, we also contribute to current literature by theorizing about situations
in which category spanning can be beneficial. We argue that the above-specified mechanisms,
typicality and quality, interact in a way that typicality is advantageous for low- and mid-quality
organizations but high-quality organizations can benefit from being atypical.
Finally, we distinguish between two kinds of category spanning. One, where the items of
diﬀerent categories appear side by side on the organization’s profile, we call it “food court” type of
spanning with respect to our empirical setting. The other type of spanning we label “fusion”; the
elements of diﬀerent categories combined within the organizational items. We argue that “fusion”
type of category spanning is more beneficial of high-quality organizations, while “food court” type
of category spanning is more beneficial to lower quality organizations.
3.2 Theoretical background and hypotheses
The interest in the implications of category spanning has a long tradition in organizational re-
search, resulting in a wide range of seemingly contradictory findings. Many researchers emphasize
the negative average eﬀect of spanning. As we discuss in detail below, these researchers evoke ex-
planations such as the negative average eﬀect of spanning on quality or typicality (eg., Zuckerman,
1999a; Hsu, 2006c; Hsu et al., 2009b; Kovacs and Hannan, 2010; Negro and Leung, 2013).
Other studies document cases in which category spanning is beneficial. The literature on related
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diversification, for example, discusses cases in which category spanning promotes the evolution of
new organizational capabilities (Markides and Williamson, 1994). Alvarez et al. (2005) develop
a micro theory of creative action by examining how distinctive artists shield their idiosyncratic
styles from the isomorphic pressures of a field. They show that auteur directors receive both
critical and public acclaim because they span multiple movie genres. Importantly, most of the
innovation literature emphasizes the positive eﬀect of spanning (“recombination”) on innovative
output (Schumpeter, 1934; Fleming, 2001). Baker (1992) documents cases in which diversification
can increase value. Villalonga (2001) argues that after taking selection eﬀects into account, no
overall negative eﬀect of “diversification discount” can be found. Dobrev et al. (2001b) finds that
larger niche width decreases the hazards for exit and disbanding.
While we do not aim here at fully reconciling all these findings, we would like to note a few
points that help situate our theorizing and delineate the scope conditions of our theory. First, the
literature that emphasizes the negative consequences of spanning typically focuses on the average
eﬀect, while the creativity and innovation literatures focus on the upper tails of the distribution
by showcasing that highly successful organizations or innovators tend to be category spanners. So
it might be the case that spanning leads to higher variance (as Fleming, 2001, shows) but at the
same time spanning is detrimental on average. Second, as we demonstrate later, it can be the case
that spanning is beneficial if the organization is of high quality or status (Phillips and Zuckerman,
2001a) but not otherwise, thus not controlling for quality or status might result in contradictory
findings. Third, if the typicality argument is right, it might be the case that category spanning
has a negative eﬀect on organizational outcome only in settings where audience perceptions play
a significant role. Fourth, the eﬀect of spanning might diﬀer by the outcome variable used. Fifth,
the consequences of category spanning might depend on environmental conditions. As Freeman
and Hannan (1983b) assert, specialists are preferred in stable environments but generalists have
higher survival rates in uncertain environment.
Given these considerations, we emphasize that our theorizing below refers to a setting in which
audience perceptions are important and that our main outcome variable is rating of the organi-
zations’ [products] by audiences. This is also a setting in which the environment is quite stable,
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at least in the few years our observational window encompasses. In the first three hypotheses we
focus on the average eﬀect of spanning, while in the last two hypotheses we explore how the eﬀect
of spanning might diﬀer by organizations.
3.2.1 The producer-side: How category spanning aﬀects average quality
Category spanning, or as it used to be referred to, the “generalists vs. specialists” issue, was
a central topic in early population ecology (Hannan and Freeman, 1977b, 1989a; Freeman and
Hannan, 1983b; Dobrev et al., 2001b). Building on the niche theory of Levins (1968), researchers
argued that because an organization’s level of resource, budget, and attention is finite, the more
markets the organization engages, (ceteris paribus) the fewer resources it can spend on developing
products, to attend to specific audiences, and to cumulate expertise in each of the categories
spanned (Hannan and Freeman, 1989a; Hannan et al., 2007b). For example, a film actor has
to decide whether to specialize in comedy or to prepare for both comedic and dramatic roles.
Because of scale advantage, such a dispersion of attention and budget implies that organizations
that span multiple categories cannot excel in each of the categories spanned. Organizations that
attempt to develop skills and invest in quality in multiple categories run the risk of becoming
a “jack of all trades but master of none” (Hannan and Freeman, 1989a; Hsu, 2006c). Building
on this argument, researchers predicted that category spanners have lower value to audiences.
This prediction has been confirmed in various settings, such as restaurants (Freeman and Hannan,
1983b), and feature films (Hsu, 2006c)4. (It is important to note that Freeman and Hannan (1983b)
argue that generalists have higher survival chances in highly uncertain environments, where the
benefits of hedging the risk against specializing in the wrong niches can outweigh the negative
eﬀects spanning has on average quality.)
The diversification literature in strategy also investigates the consequences of category span-
ning. For example, Lang and Stulz (1993) and Berger and Ofek (1995) find that diversified firms
4Another main prediction of the principle of allocation theory (Hannan and Freeman, 1989a; Hsu, 2006c) is
that category spanners (generalists) attract a wider set of audiences. Hsu (2006c), for example, demonstrates that
movies that span genres tend to get larger viewership. Although preliminary results show that this pattern holds
in our data as well, we do not pursue this line of investigation further.
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trade at a discount relative to single-segment firms. While the validity of these finding is questioned
(Villalonga, 2001), their argumentation mostly concerns producer-side consequences. For exam-
ple, Berger and Ofek (1995) cite as potential benefits of diversification “greater operating eﬃciency,
less incentive to forego positive net present value projects, greater debt capacity, and lower taxes;”
as possible negative consequences of diversification they list “the use of increased discretionary
resources to undertake value-decreasing investments, cross-subsidies that allow poor segments to
drain resources from better-performing segments, and mis-alignment of incentives between central
and divisional managers.” (Berger and Ofek, 1995, page 40.)
A common shortcoming of the above research streams is that they rarely distinguish empiri-
cally the producer-side and audience-side eﬀects of spanning and diversification. We think that
aggregate level tests are not adequate to settle whether there exists a producer-side advantage or
disadvantage of spanning, as audience-side eﬀects might counteract producer-side eﬀects. Indeed,
this might possible explain the inconsistent findings in the diversification literature. As an im-
portant exception, Negro and colleagues (Negro et al., 2010b; Negro and Leung, 2013) recently
analyzed the eﬀect of spanning on quality using a unique empirical dataset: blind tasting of wines.
Using blind taste ratings of wines to compare the quality of the wines produced by specialist
and category-spanning wine producers, they find that wines of category spanning wine producers
on average get lower ratings. This, they argue, is clear evidence of the quality eﬀect, assuming
that in blind tasting experiments the raters are unaware of the identity of the producers. Negro
et al. (2010b) also compare the blind wine tasting results with non-blind wine tasting results, and
hypothesize that the negative eﬀects of category spanning should be stronger for the non-blind
tasting setting because besides the quality-based eﬀects, socio-cognitive eﬀects are present as well.
We extend previous research by using a mediation framework to investigate whether quality
mediates the negative consequences of category spanning. We aim to demonstrate three relation-
ships. First, we test whether category spanners on average indeed confer lower quality oﬀerings.
Second, we test whether low quality oﬀerings lead to diminished value for audiences. Third, we
investigate whether quality mediates the eﬀect of category spanning. Figure 3.1 demonstrates
these relationships visually.
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Figure 3.1: Visual representation of the three hypotheses
Hypothesis 1: Organizations that span multiple categories on average receive lower value ratings
from audiences than single-category organizations.
Hypothesis 2a: Organizations that span multiple categories provide on average lower quality
oﬀerings than single-category organizations.
Hypothesis 2b: Organizations that provide lower quality oﬀerings receive lower value ratings
from audiences.
3.2.2 The audience-side: Category spanning, typicality, and audience
evaluations
A distinct group of mechanisms used to understand the consequences of category spanning focus on
the social and cognitive consequences of category spanning. Researchers in this tradition emphasize
the role audiences play in shaping organizational outcomes. For example, Hsu and Hannan (2005b),
when discussing organizational identity, assert that “[organizational identity is] not simply a list
of observable properties,” but resides in the “perceptions, beliefs, and actions of contemporaneous
audiences.” (p. 474)
Central to the perception of organizations by audiences are labels and categories used by or-
ganizations. Categories provide an interface between organizations and audiences (White, 1992;
Ruef and Patterson, 2009). Labels evoke expectations in audience members, assisting them to
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navigate the organizational space. From this aspect, category spanning is detrimental because cat-
egory spanners confuse audience members. Zuckerman (1999a) demonstrates that when financial
analysts specialize, they tend to ignore firms that span categories. Hsu (2006c) argues that cat-
egory spanning confuses audience members about the oﬀerings of the organization, which hinder
audience members in aﬃliating to organizations that fit their preferences. A main mechanism used
to justify the negative eﬀect of spanning on cognitive confusion is typicality. Because category-
spanning organizations are atypical of each of the categories spanned (Hsu et al., 2009b; Kovacs
and Hannan, 2011), audience members will not be able to make sense of them. This is especially
the case when the categories spanned are distinct (Kovacs and Hannan, 2011).
The hypothesis that typicality has a positive eﬀect on value builds on extant behavioral re-
search. An illustrative study is presented in Fiske et al. (1987), who investigate how the consistency
between labels and attributes (i.e., typicality) influences aﬀect. They presented experiment partici-
pants with descriptions of hypothetical persons. Each description consisted of a label that describes
the occupation of the person (such as doctor, artist) and personality attribute lists (e.g., obedient,
productive, greedy). Fiske and her co-authors demonstrate that subjects automatically judge the
consistency between the occupation schemata and the listed attributes (e.g., the doctor-reliable
pair is consistent, while the artist-reliable pair is less consistent), and show that the more typical
the presented person is to the category-schema, the more likely that the aﬀect toward the category
will apply to the presented person. For example, the higher the typicality of the presented doctor
is to the “doctor” schema, the higher the aﬀective rating will be. Thus, typicality in positively
valued categories increases value.
Demonstrations of the positive eﬀects of typicality on average value can be found in marketing
as well. Ward et al. (1992) study how the typicality of the physical design of fast-food restaurants
aﬀects customer liking, and demonstrate that the more typical a fast-food restaurant is in terms
of physical design (i.e., the more similar it is to the prototype, McDonald’s), the more customers
like it. Babin et al. (2004) show that the fit of the physical environment of a department store to
the category prototype increases customers’ aﬀect, quality perceptions, and shopping value. These
results are all congruent with the hypothesis that lowered typicality results in lower value.
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The chain of explanation goes as follows: category spanning decreases typicality, and lowered
typicality results in lowered value to the audience members. Because organizational research has
not yet tested this mechanism directly, we state these two steps as the following two hypotheses.
Hypothesis 3a: Organizations that span multiple categories are less typical to the categories
they populate than single-category organizations. Hypothesis 3b: Typicality on average has a
positive eﬀect on value ratings by audiences.
3.2.3 The interaction between category spanning and quality: How
high-quality organizations can benefit from category spanning
The above arguments theorized about the average eﬀect of category spanning. But could certain
types of organizations benefit from category spanning? Here we build on the innovation literature
and the literature on status and conformity (e.g., Phillips and Zuckerman, 2001a) to explore the
interaction of quality, typicality, and spanning. We argue that organizations that are of high
status or high quality might benefit from engaging in category-spanning activities. Our argument
combines two theoretical streams.
On the one hand, the innovation literature argues that innovation and problem solving are
enhanced when previously unrelated categories of knowledge or technology are brought together
and integrated. According to this view, spanning distinct and taken-for-granted categories pro-
vides actors with a broader variety of information and perspectives, which prompts unexplored
mental models (Holyoak and Thagard, 1996), leads to unusual insights (VanLehn and Jones, 1993)
and, thereby, initiates innovation (Fleming, 2001; Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001; Burt, 2004). The
innovation enhancing eﬀect of category spanning has been systematically documented across lev-
els of analyses, including individual inventors (Nerkar and Paruchuri, 2005), innovation projects
(Fleming, 2001), business units (Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001), teams (Reagans and Zuckerman,
2001) and firms (Hargadon and Sutton, 1997). Fleming (2001) shows that category spanning (re-
combination) leads to higher variance in performance: recombinative patents are more likely to be
a breakthrough success but also more likely to be a failure.
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On the other hand, audiences’ reaction to category spanners depend on the status of the orga-
nization that engages in category spanning. Phillips and Zuckerman (2001a) distinguish between
three strata of status: low, middle, and high status, and argue that the consequences of “categor-
ical imperative” diﬀer across these levels. Low-status actors are deviants who do not conform to
a minimal set of requirements to be considered as legitimate “players” in the market (Phillips and
Zuckerman, 2001a, page 385.). Middle-status actors are only considered legitimate to the extent
they conform to the rules and expectations of the relevant audience, therefore one could expect
the highest level of conformity (typicality) for middle-status actors. High-status actors, however,
are considered legitimate members of the market thus do not risk losing legitimacy by innovating.
These actors, thus, are more likely to engage in behaviors and practices that are less typical to
their category, and to use these behaviors and practices to further diﬀerentiate themselves from
their middle-status peers.
Taken these two sets of arguments and applying them to the food facilities setting, we predict
that category spanning and atypicality are more prevalent in high- and low-status food facilities
than in middle-status food facilities. As Phillips and Zuckerman (2001a) would predict, low-status
food facilities such as hot dog stands are not considered legitimate members of the restaurant
domain. Our dataset does not contain very low status food facilities that have no chance to
become legitimate member of the restaurant domain (we sampled on facilities that are listed as
restaurants). Thus the lower and middle status and quality5 restaurants in our sample have higher
need to conform to their categorical schemata and thus stay typical; only restaurants that are high
status and quality can successfully use atypicality as a way to diﬀerentiate themselves from other
restaurants in their categories.
Hypothesis 4: Typicality is mostly beneficial for mid- and low-quality restaurants. Atypicality
can be beneficial for restaurants that are of high quality.
5In this argument we assume that quality and status correlate (see Podolny, 1993). We acknowledge the pos-
sibility that status and quality are loosely coupled. Future research should address whether high quality or high
status provides more freedom for restaurants to benefit from categorical diﬀerentiation.
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3.2.4 Distinguishing the “food court” and the “fusion” type of category
spanning
Category spanning can be of two kinds: one in which the elements of the spanned categories co-
exist side-by-side but are not combined, and one in which the elements of the spanned categories
are combined into the same products6. In the case of restaurants we call this “food court” and
“fusion” type of spanning (Baron, 2004b). That is, a Mexican-French restaurant can be either such
that on one side of its menu it oﬀers Mexican dishes while on the other side it oﬀers French dishes;
or, it might mostly serve dishes that fuse elements of the two cuisines. These are qualitatively
distinct cases of category spanning. Here we argue that these restaurants would attract diﬀerent
audiences. We build this argument around sociological theory of omnivores of audiences (Peterson
and Kern, 1996). Traditionally, as Bourdieu (1984) documented, high-status individuals tended
to diﬀerentiate themselves from others whom they viewed as lower status by engaging in cultural
consumption patterns that were exclusive to them (such as going to the opera, see Bourdieu,
1984). Bourdieu argued that there exists a homology between social stratification and cultural
consumption, whereby each social group consumes a set of cultural products that are typical to
them. In the last decades, however, this cultural consumption pattern has undergone a substantial
shift, and empirical research in the sociology of consumption has documented a shift towards
omnivores in modern societies (e.g., Peterson and Kern, 1996; Vander Stichele and Laermans,
2006). High-status individuals have opened up to a wide-range of cultural preferences and consume
cultural products from a wide variety of genres, be it traditionally defined high- or low-brow
(Peterson and Kern, 1996; Vander Stichele and Laermans, 2006; Warde, 2005). Not only are
omnivores open to a wide variety of genres but they are also more tolerant to, and are often in
search of an interesting combination of categories and innovation. Thus, we predict that omnivores
are more likely to appreciate the “fusion” type of spanning.
As omnivores tend to come from more well-to-do socioeconomic backgrounds (Warde, 2005),
we predict that they can aﬀord visiting better quality and more expensive restaurants. Therefore,
6The “fusion” vs. “food court” issue could be studied at other levels of analysis as well, such as brand or line of
business. We return to this issue in the Discussion.
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we predict that:
Hypothesis 5: “Fusion” type of category spanning is more beneficial for high-quality restaurants.
3.3 Empirical setting, data sources, and data operationaliza-
tion
Our empirical setting is the restaurant domain of San Francisco. The restaurant domain provides
an apt setting to study the consequences of category spanning. First, although the restaurant
domain contains a variety of organizations, these organizations are similar enough to be compared
meaningfully. Namely, they have easily comparable product structure (menus), and the same no-
tion of quality applies to them. This would not be the case if we were to use a multi-domain
setting: for example, comparing the product structure of a car manufacturer and a fast-food chain
is unobvious, and so is comparing the quality of the oﬀerings of such organizations. Second, ana-
lyzing the restaurant domain allows us to build on previous research in restaurants and categories
(Freeman and Hannan, 1983b; Rao et al., 2003b, 2005; Carroll and Wheaton, 2009b; Kovacs and
Hannan, 2010, 2011). Third, in the restaurant domain detailed and comprehensive records are
available on restaurants, their menus, and customer evaluation. Fourth, restaurants are mostly of
comparable (and small) size, which rules out the alternative quality-based explanation that larger
organizations could develop expertise in multiple categories.
Below we discuss the three data sources we used: Yelp.com, Menupages.com, and the 2011
edition of the Zagat Guide. Our sample contains the 474 restaurants that were covered in all three
data sources.
3.3.1 Restaurant ratings
We collected the reviews on the restaurants from the website Yelp.com. The website generates its
reviews through a volunteer process in which customers can go online and write a review. Each
review captures four pieces of information that is linked to the restaurant: (1) a unique identifier
47
of the reviewer; (2) a star rating, ranging from one to five as an integer number; (3) a text review;
and (4) the date of the review. We use the reviewer IDs to control for reviewer specific eﬀects.
The average of the ratings is 3.8; the median is four stars. In this paper, we do not utilize the text
of the reviews. Note that Yelp.com encompasses a broader audience than many food and gourmet
magazines and media outlets (cf. Johnston and Baumann, 2007). We downloaded the reviews for
the restaurants starting from January 1st, 2010 until November 1st, 20117. The emerging sample
contains 59,605 reviews.
3.3.2 Restaurant menus
To compile a dataset on the menus of San Francisco restaurants, we used the website menu-
pages.com. We downloaded the menus from menupages.com on October 18, 2011. The menus are
sent by the restaurants to the management of the website (either by mail, fax, or by uploading
electronically to menupages.com), where the menus are checked and formatted in a standard for-
mat. All font styles, pictures, colors and other stylistic items are removed, and all that appear
on the menupages.com website are the names of the items oﬀered in the restaurant, their descrip-
tions, and the prices. Figure 3.2 illustrates this standard format, showing a snippet of the menu
of “Andale”, a Mexican restaurant in San Francisco. Note that in our analyses we use all items on
the menu (i.e., not only food items), because we believe that drinks can be part of the schemata
as well. For example, a typical Japanese restaurant is supposed to carry sake. As we explain later,
our method of analysis ensures that items that appear indiscriminately on most menus (such as
“coke” or “juice”) drop out from the schemas.
The restaurants self-categorize themselves each into one or more cuisine categories. They can
choose from 91 labels8. Most restaurants are in one category (44%), others are in two categories
(40%), and some are in three or more categories (16%). The most popular categories are “Sand-
7One might argue that the menu of a restaurant or the restaurant quality might change substantially in a 22-
month period. To check for the sensitivity of our results, we have rerun our regressions on the sample of reviews for
the 12 months interval between November 1st 2010 and November 1st 2011, but our main findings did not change
significantly (the results are available from the authors).
8Menupages.com actually uses a 92nd, “other” category. We excluded from our sample the six restaurants that
are listed in the “other” category. On organizational consequences of being listed in the “other category,” see Leung
and Reschke (2011).
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Figure 3.2: Illustration of the format of restaurant menus on menupages.com
This figure shows the first few items on the menu of “Andale”, a Mexican restaurant in San
Francisco.
wiches,” “Chinese,” “Italian,” and “Japanese.”
The menus vary in length. The shortest menu only lists seven items, while the restaurant with
the longest menu oﬀers 293 items (this is “Cheesecake factory”). The average number of menu items
is 92.21. Not surprisingly, there is a significant positive correlation of 0.19 between the number of
items on the menu and the number of labels assigned to the restaurant.
3.3.3 Using the Zagat Guide to assess quality
We obtained quality scores for the restaurants from a third source, the 2011 online edition of The
Zagat Guide. The Zagat Guide, similar to Yelp.com, bases its restaurant ratings on the experience
and satisfaction of restaurant goers, who voluntarily submit their ratings and reviews to Zagat.
The scores along each of these dimensions can range from 0 (lowest quality) to 30 (highest quality).
There are three major diﬀerences between Yelp.com and the Zagat Guide. First, and the reason
for choosing the Zagat Guide, Zagat reviewers are asked to score the restaurant along three specific
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dimensions: food, décor, and service. That is, Zagat’s reviewers supposedly do not take typicality
into account when evaluating the restaurants (Schkade and Kahneman, 1998, see more about this
later). Second, Zagat compiles (averages) the individual scores and only publishes the aggregated
scores along these three dimensions but not the individual scores.
Third, Zagat provides lower coverage than Yelp.com and Menupages.com, covering 474 San
Francisco restaurants in its 2011 edition. Zagat tends to cover “better” restaurants, so this is not
a random subsample. The average Yelp.com star rating of restaurants covered in Zagat is 4.1, as
opposed to the 3.72 average in the full sample. This might bias our estimates, but we do not see
this as a primary source of concern as there is still much variance in the sample, both along the
quality ratings and the Yelp star ratings.
3.3.4 Quality, typicality, and price as dimensions of value
The rating reviewers give to restaurants are a function of the perceived value of their visit to the
restaurant. The value of a product or service to a consumer can be regarded as the person’s overall
assessment of the utility of a product, brand, service, or experience (Zeithaml, 1988, page 14.).
This overall assessment often involves emotional, social, quality, and price dimensions (see Sweeney
and Soutar, 2001). The main research question addressed here is how quality and typicality of
a restaurant aﬀect its perceived value and thus influence the choices consumers make. Clearly,
our finding that quality increases value is not that surprising, so our main contribution in this
sense is examining whether typicality confers value. One issue is worth discussing here. It is
rather hard to obtain “objective” quality ratings, especially in the restaurant domain: many would
argue that restaurant- and food quality is inherently perceptual and subjective. What we mean
by “external quality assessment” is to separate the quality-related components of perceived value
from the typicality-related components of perceived value. Thus, by using “food quality” scores
from the Zagat Guide as a measure of quality, and also controlling for price, we separate various
dimensions of value. We believe that Zagat, by asking to rate specific dimensions, is successful
in priming the evaluation of specific quality criteria and hold typicality ratings in the (cognitive)
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background. In other words, while the typicality aﬀects the perception of quality, elicitations of
quality ratings in a dimension-specific way reduces the importance of typicality which it has in the
overall evaluation question (which Yelp asks). This assumption builds on results in psychology.
For example, research shows that by priming specific dimensions of evaluation, subject overweigh
the primed dimension in their overall evaluation of options (this eﬀect is known as the focusing
eﬀect, see Schkade and Kahneman, 1998). Schwarz (1996) reports an experiment in which subjects
were asked two questions: one about the number of dates they had recently, and one about their
general happiness. When the dating question was asked first, the correlation between the answers
were 0.66; when the general happiness question was asked first, the correlation dropped to 0.12,
proving that when a specific dimension is primed, subjects focus on that dimension of evaluation.
3.3.5 Assessing restaurant typicality
Hannan et al. (2007b) assert that established organizational categories build up of two main com-
ponents: a label that denotes the category and a corresponding schema that describes the category.
A schema usually consists of typical attributes that characterize the category. For example, the
schema of the “Italian” category could include words such as “pizza, pasta, mascarpone, tiramisu,
and cannelloni;” or the “Japanese” schema could include “sushi, teriyaki, udon, seaweed, nigiri.”
We note two properties of schemas: first, a schema is not simply a list of attributes but these
attributes can vary in importance to the schema, some attributes being more core than others
(Murphy, 2002); second, a schema could contain negative elements as well, i.e., elements that
should not be in the attribute list, such as having “sushi” on the menu decreases the fit to the
“Italian” schema.
The first step in our empirical strategy is to map the schemas underlying the restaurant cate-
gories. As Hannan et al. (2007b) write, a schema is a set of attributes that define a category, or
more precisely, that describes the central tendency of a category (Hannan et al., 2007b; Murphy,
2002). The typicality of an item in the category is a function of the number of attributes the
object shares with the prototype. In our empirical setting, the attributes are words in restaurant
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menus, and the schema of a restaurant category is a (weighted) set of these words.
Instead of defining what the category schemas are, we take a constructivist stance and learn
the category schemas from the menus. We want to identify the words that tend to appear on
menus of certain categories but not others, and recreate the category schemas from these word
occurrences. In the parlance of computational linguistics, this means learning the category schemas
from word-category associations (Church and Hanks, 1990; Manning and Schütze, 1999b).
Note that the approach we take here is a combination of the exemplar view and the prototype
view of categories (Murphy, 2002). On the one hand, we follow the exemplar view because we
take instances of the category and their descriptor and we learn the category schemas from these
instances. Thus, the category schemas we map from the data describe the current schemas in San
Francisco9. One the other hand, we follow the prototype approach because we identify categories
with their central tendency and do not compare the restaurant to all other restaurants in that
category individually to assess typicality.
Our approach to map category schemas is as follows. First, we calculate the typicality of each
menu words in each of the 91 categories. We calculate the typicality of the word in the category by
calculating the Jaccard-similarity of the word to the category. Formally, if #(wordi&categoryJ)
denotes the number of times the word i appears on menus in category J, #(wordi) denotes the total
number of times the word i appears on the menus of the restaurants, and #(categoryJ) denotes
the total number of items in category J, then:
Typicality(wordi, categoryJ) =
#(wordi&categoryJ)
#(wordi) + #(categoryJ) #(wordi&categoryJ) (3.1)
See the Appendix for a detailed illustration of how word-category typicality is calculated.
Jaccard similarity is a commonly used similarity measure (Batagelj and Bren, 1995), and it
satisfies three desiderata for the typicality measure: first, typicality of an item in a category
9Examining how category schemas vary across other cities and time periods would be an exciting project but it
lies outside of the scope of the current paper. But we believe that focusing on restaurant schemata in San Francisco
is the right approach to take, as we investigate the eﬀect of category spanning on ratings from San Francisco, so
whatever the local schemas are, they need to be used to assess category spanning.
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increases with the number of co-occurrences; second, typicality of an item in a category decreases
with the number of times the category appears. These two criteria ensure that items that tend
to appear with a category have high typicality (e.g., the word “brie” tends to appear on menus of
French restaurants). The third property of Jaccard-similarity (typicality of an item in a category
decreases with the number of times the item appears), discounts items that appear on most menus
indiscriminately (such as “juice” or “coke”).
For computational simplicity, to assess category schemas we only include words that are men-
tioned at least five times in the whole dataset. We exclude all prepositions, conjunctions, and
interjections. This leaves us with 12,323 unique words. We calculate the typicality of these 12,323
words in all the 91 categories.
In the next step, we calculate the typicality of each restaurant in each category by aggregating
the individual word-category associations by taking the average of the category-word typicality for
all words in the menu. Thus, each restaurant is assigned a typicality score in each category, where
the typicality score ranges from 0 to 1; 0 denoting the lowest typicality and 1 denoting the highest
typicality. Because of the typicality values are low in absolute number (due to the division by the
count of words in the Jaccard formula), for better interpretability we rescale the typicality values
so that the maximum observed value of typicality will be one. Note that as such a multiplicative
rescaling only changes the unit of measurement. Before proceeding with the analysis, we provide
three validations for our typicality measure. Figure 3.3, which illustrates category schema for three
categories, provides the first validation: Italian, French, and Greek (for readability we only show
a select set of words, the schemas contain many more words). In the figure, the centers of the
categories are denoted by the triangle, and the distance of words from the category centers are
inversely related to their typicality score. This graph was calculated with Correspondence Analysis,
a commonly used method to plot dual item-category distance data (Greenacre, 1984). The figure
shows that some words are close to the Italian category but not to other: e.g., “pasta,” “prosciutto,”
“ricotta,” or “mozzarella.” Some words are close to the Italian category but are also close to the
French category, such as “onion,” “balsamic,” or “wine”. These are words that are typical to both
the French and Italian schemas. Finally, some words such as “bread,” “olive,” and “salad” are at
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Figure 3.3: Category codes of three selected categories (Italian, French, Greek)
Correspondence Analysis on a selected set of words.
equidistance from the three categories, indicating that they are present in all three categories but
are not highly distinctive of each categories. The schemas on this figure do correspond to our
expectation, providing face validity to our word-category typicality measure.
For a second validation, we build on previous results in cognitive psychology demonstrating that
categorization is a positive function of typicality (Hampton, 1998). We expect that the more typical
a restaurant is to a category, the more likely the restaurant is self-categorized in that category. To
test this proposition, we ran logistic regressions using typicality to predict whether a restaurant
categorizes itself in the category. Results (not shown here) demonstrate a strong correspondence
between typicality and categorization: the coeﬃcient is positive and significant, and typicality
explains 62% of the variation in categorization. This relationship holds even when we do not
use the same restaurants to estimate typicality and predict categorization: our analyses show
that the typicality values have a strong predictive power even on restaurants outside the sample
(taking a hold-out sample approach, see Stone, 1974). On Figure 3.4, we plot the probability of
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Figure 3.4: Typicality and the probability that the restaurant will belong to that category
categorization as a function of typicality, and find a positive relationship (note that the shape of
this curve is similar to that in Figure 2 of Hampton 1998).
Figure 3.5 provides a third validation, demonstrating that using menu words to explore the
category structure of restaurants captures the macro category structure well. We calculated the
Jaccard-similarity between the categories (Batagelj and Bren, 1995) in terms of menu word over-
laps: two categories are similar if words that appear on menus of category A tend to appear on
menus of category B and vice versa. The specific measure we use is
simJaccard(catA, catB) =
(count of words in bothAandB)
(count of words in either A or B)
(3.2)
On Figure 3.5, we use these similarity values to create a hierarchical clustering of the restaurant
categories (to avoid cluttering on the figure, we only plot the clustering for categories with at least
five restaurants). As the figure shows, the category structure recovered by this method has high
face validity, confirming the validity of mapping categories based on menu word occurrences.
Finally, to measure the typicality of the restaurants in the labels it claims, for each restaurant we
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Figure 3.5: Hierarchical clustering of restaurant cuisines with more than five instances
Calculated based on the Jaccard similarity of the cuisines, based on the overlap in menu-words.
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Figure 3.6: Distribution of the rescaled typicality values of restaurants in the categories they are
classified in
aggregate the typicality of words it contains on its menu (calculations are shown in the Appendix).
Figure 3.6 shows the distribution of the typicality values for restaurants in our sample. The figure
shows a large variance in typicality of organizations in the categories they are in. We exploit this
variance to understand the eﬀects of typicality on audience value.
Our measure of typicality has an important assumption: we assume that schemas are shared by
all actors. While it has been argued that category systems are more useful if there is a consensus
about the category schemata (Hannan et al., 2007b), there is undoubtedly some variance in the
schemata audience members use to evaluate organizations. As we do not have access to these
schemata, we assume that the schemata are shared.
3.3.6 Distinguishing “food court” and “fusion” type of category spanning
As we discussed above, category spanning can be of two kinds: one in which the elements of the
spanned categories co-exist side-by-side but are not combined (“food court”), and one in which the
elements of the spanned categories are combined into the same products (“fusion”). To diﬀerentiate
these two cases, we calculate the typicality of each of the dishes in the menus to each of the 91
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categories. I.e., we follow the same procedure as for the menus above but now at the dish level.
For food courts, we expect that each of the dishes will be only typical to a single cuisine, but that
there will be dishes from multiple cuisines on the menu. For example, one half of the menu is
Japanese, the other half is Italian. For fusion restaurants, however, we expect that the individual
dishes will themselves belong to multiple categories. For example, the dishes on the menu combine
ingredients and techniques from Japanese and Italian cuisines.
We measure the extent of “fusion” kind of category spanning by calculating the Herfindahl
index of the grade-of-memberships of each dish in each cuisine, and then average these values
for each restaurant. For example, if a menu contains two dishes, Dish 1 is 80% Italian and
20% Japanese, Dish 2 is 50% Italian 50% Japanese, then the measure for fusion is calculated as:
((.8^2+.2^2)+(.5^2+.5^2))/2=.59. Note that this fusion measure falls between 1/91 (pure fusion)
and 1 (pure food court), controlling for the overall extent of spanning.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Variables
Our main outcome variable is the rating provided by Yelp.com reviewers. Our first explanatory
variable is continuous measure of category spanning: organizational niche width. Traditionally,
organizational niche width has been measured with the count of market segments the organization
targets (e.g., Hsu et al., 2009b). Recently, Kovacs and Hannan (2011) argued that such a simple
counting of categories is not optimal because it does not take the similarity structure of categories
into account. For example, while both in two categories, a “Mexican” and “Indian” restaurant has
a wider niche than an “American (New)” and “Californian” restaurant. Kovacs and Hannan (2011)
propose a novel measure of niche width that captures the similarity structure of the categories
spanned.
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NW =
8>><>>:
0 if catnum = 1;
catnumxd¯x if catnum > 1.
where catnum denotes the number of categories the organization claims, and d¯x denotes the
average Jaccard-distance between the categories spanned, as calculated in eqn (2). For example,
as the distance between the “American (New)” and “Californian” categories is 0.56, the niche width
of a restaurant that spans these two categories is 1.12, while the niche width of a “Mexican” and
“Indian” restaurant is 1.94.
As we believe that this niche width measure is superior to simple category counting, this is the
measure we use in the results presented throughout the paper. However, we note that additional
analyses (not shown in the paper) revealed that the results hold even if we use the number of
categories as a measure of niche width.
The other two main explanatory variables: (1) restaurant quality measured with Zagat food
quality scores downloaded from the online version of the 2011 Zagat Guide and (2) restaurant
typicality, have been described above.
We include a number of control variables. First, we control for the price level of restaurants.
Yelp.com uses four categories to classify the price level of restaurant, indicating “the approximate
cost per person for a meal, including one drink, tax and tips.” (Yelp.com) A “$” restaurant denotes
“cheap, under $10,” “$$” denotes “moderate, $11-$30,” “$$$” denotes “spendy, $30-$61, ” and “$$$$”
denotes “splurge, above $61”. In our sample, 32% of the restaurants are in the lowest price range,
49% are in the “$$” range, 15% are in the “$$$” range, and the rest 4% are in the “$$$$” category.
To allow for the non-linear eﬀect of price, we included dummy variables for all level of the Yelp
price rating. Second, we control for the overall popularity of the restaurants. We measure the
popularity of a restaurant with the number of reviews it has received prior to the focal review.
Third, we control for reviewers’ activism, as previous studies show that activist reviewers tend to
give lower ratings (Kovacs and Hannan, 2010). We measure reviewers’ activism with the number
of reviews they have written prior to the focal review (Kovacs and Hannan, 2010). To take into
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics and Pearson correlations for the main variables (N=56,605)
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Rating 3.795 1.11
2. Price 2.316 0.746 0.034
3. Niche width 0.474 0.466 0.007 0.057
4. Typicality 0.255 0.145 -0.048 -0.41 -0.411
5. Ln(popularity) 5.705 0.777 0.098 0.095 0.082 -0.145
6. Ln(activism) 1.346 1.276 -0.032 -0.021 -0.001 -0.016 -0.036
7. Zagat’s food quality score 21.988 2.871 0.209 0.383 -0.036 -0.148 0.271 -0.002
8. Restaurant age at review (in days) 144.376 52.742 0.028 0.036 -0.037 0.118 0.459 -0.092 0.099
account the diminishing eﬀects of popularity and activism, we used the log of the count of reviews
written about the restaurant and the count of reviews written by the reviewer. Fourth, we control
for the restaurant’s age at the review, which we measure with the number of months since the first
review of the restaurant. Fifth, to control for cuisine specific eﬀects, we include dummy variables
for the categories the restaurant is in. Finally, to control for geographical heterogeneity among
restaurants, we include dummy variables for the ZIP code of the restaurant. See Table 3.1 for
descriptive statistics and correlations for the main variables.
3.4.2 The main eﬀect of category spanning
We start by investigating the main eﬀect of category spanning on value. Because of the ordinal and
bounded nature of the outcome variable (the rating is from one star to five stars), we analyze the
eﬀect of category spanning on reviews using an ordered logit modeling framework. This framework
has been used previously to analyze restaurant ratings (Kovacs and Hannan, 2010, 2011)10 . As
some control variables are review specific, we conduct the analyses at the review level. To account
for possible heterogeneity among reviewers and restaurants, we present robust standard errors, but
the results we present hold with alternative approaches to standard error calculations as well, such
as clustering on reviewers and clustering on restaurants.
Table 3.2 presents the results. Model 1 shows the main eﬀect of niche width on value. Model
10We note that all the results presented below hold with linear regression specifications as well.
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Table 3.2: Ordered logit regressions on Yelp ratings
The eﬀect of category spanning (measured with niche width)
(1) (2)
Niche width -0.095*** -0.139***
(0.032) (0.032)
Ln(popularity) 0.285***
(0.014)
Ln(activism) -0.105***
(0.006)
Restaurant age at review -0.006***
(0.001)
Price=$$ (dummy) -0.257***
(0.032)
Price=$$$ (dummy) -0.188***
(0.037)
Price=$$$$ (dummy) 0.277***
(0.056)
Cuisine dummies included Yes Yes
Zip code dummies included Yes Yes
Log-likelihood -82,113 -81,665
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. N=59,605
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Table 3.3: Linear regressions on Zagat food quality scores
The eﬀect of category spanning (measured with niche width)
Outcome: food quality score
Niche width -0.514*** -0.865***
(0.042) (0.04)
Ln(popularity) 0.970***
(0.019)
Ln(activism) -0.001
(0.007)
Restaurant age at review -0.309***
(0.036)
Price=$$ (dummy) 1.206***
(0.042)
Price=$$$ (dummy) 3.911***
(0.069)
Price=$$$$ (dummy) -0.019***
(0.001)
Cuisine dummies included Yes Yes
Zip code dummies included Yes Yes
R-square 0.4 0.509
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. N=59,605
2 includes the control variables. Both models confirm the hypothesis that restaurants with wider
niches receive lower ratings. Table 3.2 shows that the eﬀect of price is not linear: cheap ($) and very
expensive ($$$$) restaurants are more highly rated than medium price restaurants. The control
variables have the expected eﬀect: more popular restaurants get higher ratings; and, consistent
with the previous results of Kovacs and Hannan (2010), activists tend to give lower ratings.
3.4.3 Quality as a mediator of the negative eﬀect of category spanning
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 analyze the mediating eﬀect of quality. Table 3.3 contains two models inves-
tigating the eﬀect of category spanning on quality. The results confirm Hypothesis 2a: category-
spanning restaurants receive significantly lower food quality scores.
To test the second step of the mediation, we investigate how the food quality scores aﬀect Yelp
ratings. Table 3.4 shows the results. As expected, Zagat scores have a positive eﬀect on Yelp
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Table 3.4: The relationship between Zagat food quality scores and Yelp ratings (ordered logit
regressions)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Zagat’s food quality score 0.139*** 0.135*** 0.135***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Niche width -0.025 -0.139***
(0.033) (0.032)
ln(popularity) 0.156*** 0.157*** 0.285***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014)
ln(activism) -0.105*** -0.105*** -0.105***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Restaurant age at review -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Price=$$ (dummy) -0.213*** -0.213*** -0.257***
(0.033) (0.033) (0.032)
Price=$$$ (dummy) -0.350*** -0.349*** -0.188***
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
Price=$$$$ (dummy) -0.257*** -0.253*** 0.277***
(0.058) (0.058) (0.056)
Cuisine dummies included Yes Yes Yes Yes
Zip code dummies included Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log-likelihood -81273 -81020 -81020 -81665
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. N=59,605
ratings: the better the quality of the food, the higher the average star rating on Yelp, even after
including the control variables.
The results of Tables 3.3 and 3.4 confirm the mediating eﬀect of quality in the negative relation-
ship between category spanning and value. The comparison of models 3 and 4 in Table 3.4 shows
that the mediation is complete: including the quality-related variables decreases the magnitude of
the negative eﬀect of category spanning to a level at which it becomes insignificant.
3.4.4 Typicality as a mediator of the negative eﬀect of category spanning
In the next analyses, we investigate whether typicality serves as a mediator in the relationship
between category spanning and value ratings. Table 3.5 shows the first step in the mediation
analysis: the eﬀect of category spanning on typicality. Because typicality is a continuous variable,
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Table 3.5: The eﬀect of category spanning on typicality (linear regression)
Outcome: typicality
Niche width -0.024*** -0.017***
(0.001) (0.001)
ln(popularity) 0.001***
(0.000)
ln(activism) -0.010***
(0.001)
Restaurant age at review 0.000**
(0.000)
Price=$$ (dummy) -0.054***
(0.002)
Price=$$$ (dummy) -0.102***
(0.002)
Price=$$$$ (dummy) -0.124***
(0.002)
Cuisine dummies included Yes Yes
Zip code dummies included Yes Yes
R-square 0.819 0.846
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. N=59,605
we run linear regressions. Both models in the table confirm the hypothesis that category spanning
decreases typicality. We note, however, that the eﬀect size is rather small – this is partly due to
the inclusion of cuisine- and ZIP code fixed eﬀects but nevertheless casts shadows on the general
practice of assuming that category spanners are clearly less typical to their categories than single-
category organizations.
In Table 3.6, we test the second step of the mediation: the eﬀect of typicality on ratings.
In model 1, we only include typicality and the main control variables. In this model, typicality
does not have a significant eﬀect on ratings. However, as we demonstrated above, the quality
scores strongly aﬀect ratings. Thus, to model the eﬀects of typicality, one needs to control for the
quality-eﬀects. In models 2-4, we include the food quality scores. To investigate whether the eﬀect
of typicality varies depending on the characteristics of restaurants, we include interaction variables
with niche width, food quality, and price. As the comparison of the log-likelihoods shows, the
full models provide significantly better fit. In models 3 and 4, the estimate of typicality becomes
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highly significant, and its eﬀect size increases substantially. As models 3 and 4 are the best fitting
models, we conclude that typicality indeed increases ratings. This finding confirms the second step
of Hypothesis 3.
Hypothesis 4 posits that high quality restaurants can benefit from atypicality. The results in
Models 3, 4, and 5 of Table 3.6 confirm Hypothesis 4: the main eﬀect of typicality is positive,
but the interaction with food quality is significant and negative. The Zagat quality scores range
from 1 to 30, and model 4 suggests that atypicality is beneficial for restaurants that score 23 or
higher (calculated as 4.157/.181). Thus, typicality is beneficial for lower quality restaurants but
as the food quality of the restaurant increases, the benefits of typicality wane, and for high quality
restaurants it turns negative. Figure 3.7 visualizes eﬀect of typicality for restaurants at diﬀerent
levels of niche width and food quality. Finally, note that typicality increases ratings especially for
middle-priced restaurant.
The negative interaction eﬀect between quality and typicality also shows up in the negative
pairwise correlation between quality and typicality. The restaurant-level -.127 correlation between
Zagat food score and restaurant typicality (significant at p<.01) indicates that high quality restau-
rants are more likely to be atypical.
The strong negative interaction eﬀect between niche width and typicality in Table 3.6 is worth
further discussion. This finding, together with the positive main eﬀect of niche width, shows that
category spanning is detrimental to the extent that the restaurants actually engages in the multiple
cuisines it claims in their labels. In other words, if a restaurant claims multiple labels and it tries
to be typical to all the labels it claims then it is worse oﬀ than restaurants that claim multiple
labels but concentrate their eﬀorts to one cuisine and are atypical to the other labels. This finding
is consistent with current understanding of category spanning. Kovacs and Hannan (2010), for
example, assert that organizations that span multiple high contrast categories suﬀer most from
spanning, because being member of multiple strong identity categories sends conflicting signals to
audience members.
Hypothesis 5 posits that “Fusion” type of category spanning is more beneficial for high-quality
restaurants. Model 5 in Table 3.6 investigates this hypothesis by adding to Model 4 “fusion” and
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its interaction with food quality. Recall that to assess whether a restaurant engages in “fusion”
kind of spanning, for each dish on the menu we calculate the Herfindahl index of typicality values
and then we take the average of these Herfindahl indices for each restaurant. The reason behind
this measure is that fusion restaurants tend to have low average Herfindahl values as they combine
ingredients and techniques within dishes. As these average values are not normally distributed, we
use a binary measure here: a restaurant is tagged as fusion if its average within-dish Herfindahl
index is below the population average. Model 5 shows that on average it is detrimental to be a
fusion restaurant. However, high-quality restaurants can benefit from being a fusion. This result
confirms Hypothesis 5.
Finally, in an additional set of analysis not shown here, we investigated whether reviewer
activism moderates the eﬀect of category spanning and typicality on ratings. In line with Kovacs
and Hannan (2010), we found that category spanning and typicality have a weaker influence on
ratings by activist reviewers. We share the explanation by Kovacs and Hannan (2010), who argue
that activist reviewers and reviewers with domain expertise are less likely to use category cues to
navigate the organizational space, so the possible confusion arising from category spanning are less
likely to aﬀect them.
3.4.5 Robustness checks
To investigate the robustness of the above findings, we conducted several sensitivity analyses. As
none of the robustness checks lead to estimates that are substantially diﬀerent from the results pre-
sented above, we do not show them here, just list the alternative specifications we tried. First, as
an alternative specification for category spanning, we used a binary version of the niche width vari-
able (0 if single-category organization, 1 if multiple-category organization), and also tried models
in which niche width is measured with the number of categories the restaurant populates. Second,
we reran all the above analyses on the organization level, aggregating ratings and organizational
and reviewer characteristics by organizations. Although some coeﬃcients have changed slightly
and some estimated coeﬃcients lost significance in these alternative specifications, all results are
66
Table 3.6: The eﬀect of typicality, quality, and category spanning on Yelp ratings (ordered logit
regressions)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Typicality -0.040 0.231* 4.617*** 4.157*** 4.220***
(0.132) (0.133) (0.632) (0.651) (0.652)
ln(popularity) 0.284*** 0.158*** 0.157*** 0.154*** 0.153***
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
ln(activism) -0.105*** -0.105*** -0.105*** -0.104*** -0.104***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Restaurant age at review -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Price=$$ (dummy) -0.257*** -0.200*** -0.202*** -0.475*** -0.456***
(0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.075) (0.075)
Price=$$$ (dummy) -0.197*** -0.327*** -0.342*** -0.633*** -0.619***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.040) (0.091) (0.092)
Price=$$$$ (dummy) 0.258*** -0.229*** -0.301*** -0.188 -0.211
(0.059) (0.060) (0.062) (0.160) (0.160)
Zagat’s food quality score 0.136*** 0.180*** 0.181*** 0.172***
(0.004) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010)
Niche width 0.178*** 0.224*** 0.237***
(0.053) (0.055) (0.055)
Niche width x Typicality -0.469*** -0.537*** -0.538***
(0.112) (0.117) (0.118)
Zagat’s food quality score x Typicality -0.177*** -0.174***
(0.029) (0.029)
Price=$$ (dummy) x Typicality 0.773*** 0.771***
(0.189) (0.191)
Price=$$$ (dummy) x Typicality 0.923*** 0.941***
(0.307) (0.307)
Price=$$$$ (dummy) x Typicality -1.696** -1.533*
(0.836) (0.838)
Fusion restaurant -0.372**
(0.162)
Fusion X Zagat’s food quality 0.013*
(0.007)
Cuisine dummies included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Zip code dummies included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log-likelihood -81675 -81019 -80989 -80974 -80966
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. N=59,605
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Figure 3.7: Predicted eﬀect of typicality
(based on the estimates of Model 4 of Table 6)
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consistent the general empirical patterns described above.
3.5 Discussion
In this paper, we set out to study the mechanisms that drive how category spanning aﬀects
audiences’ value ratings of organizations. We focused on the two mechanisms that are most often
evoked in current organizational literature: the quality-based explanation and the typicality-based
explanation. Our empirical setting was restaurants and restaurant reviews in San Francisco. To
assess the typicality of restaurants, we collected the menus of restaurants. To assess the quality of
the restaurants, we collected the food quality scores from The Zagat Guide.
The first contribution of this paper is that we demonstrate that quality mediates the negative
average eﬀect of category spanning on value ratings: lower quality leads to lower ratings and
restaurants in multiple categories on average confer lower quality than single-category restaurant.
These findings provide a direct corroboration of the assumption behind the principle of allocation
(Hannan and Freeman, 1989a). We also demonstrate the positive relationship between typicality
and audience value ratings. While these two relationships have been widely hold true (Hannan
et al., 2007b; Hsu et al., 2009b; Kovacs and Hannan, 2010, 2011), researchers have only provided
indirect evidence by demonstrating the negative eﬀect of category spanning on audience value
(Hsu, 2006c; Kovacs and Hannan, 2010, 2011). We argued that a more direct test of typicality was
needed. On the one hand, no previous research has shown that category spanning indeed diminishes
typicality in the categories spanned. On the other hand, the multiple category approach cannot
say anything about the typicality of single-category organizations. By collecting and analyzing
restaurant menus, we were able to assess the oﬀering of the restaurants and directly assess the fit
to the schema of the categories claimed by the restaurants. We believe that such a test is unique in
the organizational literature. Combining the eﬀects of category spanning, typicality, and quality
in a single model (Table 3.6, Model 4), we find that these mechanisms provide related yet distinct
eﬀects on value. Quality does not explain away the eﬀects of typicality, nor does typicality account
for the importance of quality.
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Besides demonstrating that category spanning has a negative eﬀect on value on average, we also
argued that certain types of organizations could benefit from atypicality and category spanning.
We found that being typical is especially important for low- and mid-quality restaurants. High-
quality restaurants, on the other hand, may benefit from category spanning and atypicality. This
pattern is consistent with multiple streams of previous research. Phillips and Zuckerman (2001a)
demonstrate that high status actors bear lower costs of illegitimacy than middle or lower status
actors. Waguespack and Sorenson (2010) show that high status of film producers increases their
chance of getting favorable classification. Another explanation consistent with our findings could
concern audience heterogeneity and the tendency toward novelty seeking. Ward and Loken (1988)
demonstrate that the positive eﬀects of product typicality are more pronounced if customers do
not look for novelty or exclusiveness. Babin et al. (2004), although confirm an overall positive
relationship between typicality and value, also note that some subjects are novelty seekers, and
slight deviance from the prototypes could often result in higher value. High-quality restaurants
can thus benefit from spanning if customers who visit high-quality restaurants are more likely to
be novelty seekers than customers of lower quality restaurants.
Finally, we diﬀerentiate between two types of category spanning, “fusion” and “food court”
(Baron, 2004a). We argued that high-quality restaurants could benefit from fusion type of spanning
as they attract novelty-seeking patrons and the high quality or prestige of the restaurant might
make these audiences less suspicious of innovative dishes. Restaurants that are of low- or mid-
quality should not try to innovate, however, as atypicality will hurt them. Thus, if they are to
engage in any kind of spanning, it should be the less innovative “food court” kind of spanning.
Here we would like to note that while we contrasted the two types of spanning at the restaurant
menu level, this distinction has interesting parallels at other levels of analysis as well. For example,
at the organization-brand level, it relates to the issue whether it is more beneficial for a firm to
structure its products into separate but specialized brands or to combine the products under
the umbrella of a unified brand. Or, at the organization structure level the “fusion” vs. “food
court” diﬀerentiation relates to whether diﬀerent lines of businesses should be integrated or kept
separate. While further elaborating on these parallels is beyond the scope of the current paper,
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we note that, for example, the typicality-based argument would imply that keeping brands and
lines of businesses separate is beneficial. This would be an argument favoring conglomerates that
keep their brands focused and separate thus do not confuse their audiences. Combining the brands
would be beneficial for brands with high quality (or status).
The corroboration of the positive average eﬀect of typicality has implication for current research
in organizational authenticity. Carroll and Wheaton (2009b) argue that restaurants that are viewed
as authentic are viewed more favorable by patrons. One of their constructs of authenticity is type-
authenticity: an organization is type-authentic if its attributes and practices are consistent with
its type. This construct is similar to what we call typicality. Our findings indicate that type
authenticity should be especially important for low- and mid-quality level restaurant. Future
research could address how authenticity relates to quality and category spanning (see also Kovács,
Carroll, and Lehman, forthcoming) and how the four types of authenticity proposed by Carroll
and Wheaton (2009b) help explain the consequences of category spanning.
3.5.1 Limitations and future research
This study is not without limitations. First, we focused on the restaurant domain. A main
advantage of the restaurant domain is that while it contains multiple categories, these categories
and their schemas are highly commensurable as the oﬀerings (menus) have the same structure. The
question of generalizability to other contexts naturally arises. While we believe that the eﬀects
of category spanning, typicality, and quality are generalizable to other settings, we acknowledge
that their relative importance might vary across settings. Take for example hypothesis 4, which
argued that high-quality restaurants could benefit from being atypical but mid- and low-quality
institutions benefit from being typical. This finding might be specific to domains that value
creativity, innovation, and novelty seeking but are at the same time put emphasis on category fit.
In domains where novelty seeking or artistry is not important (for example, traditional financial
institutions) or very important (such as design or creative art), this pattern might not hold. We
encourage future research in such domains.
71
Second, we focused on the eﬀects of category spanning on value ratings by audiences, and
one could ask whether our findings generalize to other outcome variables such as profitability or
survival. Investigating the eﬀect of category spanning, typicality, and quality on these outcome
variables is not possible with our data, and given the intricate relationship between specialism,
generalism, profit, and survival, we refrain from making firm predictions. One the one hand, as
restaurant ratings positively influence revenues (Luca, 2011b), and value ratings negatively influ-
ence mortality (Hannan and Freeman, 1989a), one could argue that our findings would generalize
to profitability and survival. On the other hand, however, as population ecologists have shown,
the trade-oﬀ between specialism and generalism often depends on environmental factors such as
the stability audience taste and demand (Hannan and Freeman, 1989a). When the environment
is in flux, category spanning could be a more beneficial strategy in order to hedge against changes
in taste. Similarly, atypicality might be beneficial if the organization can predict changes in taste
and create their own market niches. We leave the disentangling of these eﬀects for future work.
Third, for the categorization of restaurants we use the categories the restaurants self-declare
on Menupages.com. This is possibly problematic on two accounts. First, a large proportion of
consumers probably do not choose restaurants based on Menupages.com, so this categorization
might not be to consumers. Consumers might decide based on alternative classifications for the
restaurants or might not use category information at all. In this paper, we assumed that the cat-
egory claims the restaurant makes on menupages.com coincide with the category claims it makes
in other places such as on other consumer websites, on their menus, or during advertising. Sec-
ond, the self-declared categorization of a restaurant might diﬀer from the “real” categorization for
strategic reasons: restaurant might intentionally try to misrepresent themselves by either claiming
labels they shouldn’t or by not claiming labels that they should. Although we do not think that
this behavior is pervasive, with our data we cannot rule it out. We leave it for future research to
explore and test the possible consequences of the above two self-reporting biases.
Admittedly, our tests suﬀer from survival bias: Our sample consists of restaurants that oper-
ated in October 2011, at the time of data collection. Unfortunately, data limitations prohibit us
from addressing this selection problem. Future research could address this issue by prospectively
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downloading menus and coding the Zagat Guide in future years. Also, we focused on a single city,
San Francisco, and mapped the restaurant schemas in that city. This is adequate for our empirical
study as we use local schemas to predict local value, but it would be interesting to gather and an-
alyze menus and reviews from other settings and understand how restaurant schemas diﬀer across
cities or countries.
We also assumed in this paper that the category system is stable. This is an especially sensitive
assumption in the case of category spanning because in certain cases category spanners may create
a new category by combining two previously distinct categories (for example, this is how the
"minivan" category was created. See Rosa et al., 1999). We believe, however, that such cases
are rare. In the domain of restaurant one could mention “minivan-like” new categories such as
“Tex-Mex” or “Californian.” But these are rare cases and are very atypical. We [the authors]
can personally recount numerous novel combinations from the San Francisco dining scene (Indian
pizza, sushi taco, curry frozen yoghurt, just to mention a few) but very few of these caught on.
Most category combinations never become successful and do not establish a new category. Second,
not only are these new combinations unlikely to stick but they often take a longer time period to
really become an established new category. We checked on menupages.com if any new category has
been added during our observation period. No new categories have appeared on the San Francisco
menupages.com website since January 1st, 2010. Slightly before our observation period started the
“gastropub” category was added. As this example demonstrates, new categories do occasionally
emerge. Given that only seven restaurants in our dataset are classified as gastropub, these cases
do not threaten the validity our findings (our results hold after dropping these seven restaurants).
One would need to take into account the changes in the category structure, however, if the study
were to encompass a significantly longer time period, say 20-30 years.
A related limitation is that we analyze the data as cross-sectional and thus we cannot claim to
show causality of the eﬀect. Ideally, we would need panel data on both the Zagat scores and on
the changes in the restaurant menus. Future research on category spanning is advised to collect
panel data on the relevant variables in order to explore the causal relationships among category
spanning, typicality, and quality.
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Another limitation of the paper is that we could not account for the eﬀect that labels (beyond
the eﬀect through typicality) might directly influence the perception of the restaurants and the
food served. Research shows that customers change their perception of the products as a function
of the labels applied to them. For example, Wansink and Park (2002) demonstrate that subjects
rate the same (non-soy containing) snack less tasteful but more healthy if the label indicate that
the snack contains soy. Wansink and Park (2002) show that subjects who ate foods with evocative
menu names (such as “Succulent Italian Seafood Filet”) generated a larger number of positive
comments about the food and rated it as significantly more tasty than those eating regularly-
named counterparts (such as “Seafood Filet”). Future research should address how these eﬀects
interact with typicality eﬀects.
Some might also find it problematic that our measure for restaurant quality is perceptual.
We would argue that quality is often ambiguous and in most domains of life quality is relative
to viewpoints, tastes, preferences, or customs. Not only is this true for food and most cultural
products but for most consumer goods as well (Shepard, 1987). If so, a researcher cannot do
otherwise but measure quality as perceived by relevant audience members. Having said this,
we encourage future studies of the eﬀect of category spanning in domains where quality can be
measured more objectively.
A final avenue for future research could be to use more advanced computational linguistic ap-
proaches to map category schemas, such as topic modeling (Griﬃths and Steyvers, 2004). On a
related point, future research could further scrutinize how category schemas are stored, specifi-
cally, whether categories should be represented with the prototype, the exemplar, or some other
frameworks (Murphy, 2002). In this paper, we followed a combination of the prototype and exem-
plar views, but future research could investigate which representation describes audience members’
behavior better.
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3.6 Appendix
This Appendix provides an illustration how the typicality values are calculated for single and for
multiple category restaurants. In this hypothetical example, there are four restaurants, each with
only one or two items (see left panel). First, we transform this table to a category-word occurrence
table (see right panel). In case of multiple category restaurants we divide the occurrence of the
menu items with the number of categories the restaurant belongs to. For example in Restaurant
C the “mushroom” item will get 0.5 value in the “French” and 0.5 value in the “Spanish” category.
Name Categories Item
Restaurant A French mushroom sandwich
Restaurant A French mushroom quiche
Restaurant B Italian mozzarella sandwich
Restaurant B Italian pizza
Restaurant C French & Spanish mushroom quiche
Restaurant C French & Spanish paella
Restaurant D Tex-Mex chili
Categories mushroom sandwich quiche pizza mozzarella paella chili
French 2.5 1 1.5 0.5
Italian 1 1 1
Spanish 0.5 0.5 0.5
Tex-Mex 1
Then we calculate the Jaccard similarity index for all word-category pairs. Each cell is calcu-
lated according to the following formula:
Typicality(wordi, categoryJ) =
#(wordi&categoryJ )
#(wordi)+#(categoryJ ) #(wordi&categoryJ )
where#(wordicategoryJ) denotes the number of times the wordi appears on menus in categoryJ ,
#(wordi) denotes the total number of times the wordi appears on the menus, and #(categoryJ)
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denotes the total number of items in categoryJ . For example, the word “mushroom” appears 2.5
times in “French” menus, it appears three times in total, and there are 5.5 words in total in French
menus: Typicality(“mushroom”,”French”)=2.5/(3+5.5-2.5)=0.42
Categories mushroom sandwich quiche pizza mozzarella paella chili
French 0.42 0.15 0.25 0 0 0.08 0
Italian 0 0.25 0 0.33 0.33 0 0
Spanish 0.1 0 0.2 0 0 0.25 0
Tex-Mex 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
From this, we calculate the typicality of each restaurant in each category by taking the weighted
average of the Jaccard-similarities of the menu words in that category. For example, the
typicality of “Restaurant A” in the ”French” category is calculated as (2*0.42+0.15+0.25)/4 =
0.31, whereas the typicality of “Restaurant C” in the “French” category is calculated as
(0.5*0.42+0.5*0.25+0.5*0.084)=0.13 Finally, to assess typicality of the restaurant in the labels it
claims, we sum the typicality values for each organization in all categories it is in (these values
are 0.31; 0.31; 0.13, 0.09 and 1).
Name French Italian Spanish Tex-Mex
Restaurant A 0.31 0.06 0.07 0
Restaurant B 0.05 0.31 0 0
Restaurant C 0.13 0 0.09 0
Restaurant D 0 0 0 1
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Chapter 4
The dynamics of project popularity from a
collective behavior prospective: A study of
creative crowdfunding
Abstract
There are recent studies directing the attention towards the significance of peer influence in prod-
uct valuation processes. Audience members rarely make their decision in isolation from others, but
they infer quality from their peers’ behavior. The ever-increasing use of reviewer sites boosts the
number of markets where the dynamics of social influence significantly aﬀects the predictability of
product popularity. I analyze the dynamics of social valuations processes in the context of creative
projects’ crowdfunding activity. I approach audience members’ decision from a collective behav-
ior prospective. Building on the concept of threshold model, I hypothesize that early audience
members draw their decisions relying more strongly on the objective information of project at-
tributes, while audience members who donate to the project later will be influenced more strongly
by their peers. This micro level mechanism leads to the macro level consequence, namely that the
popularity of a project depends on its early evaluations. The analysis of more than five thousand
projects on the Kickstarter.com website reinforces the above argument, demonstrating that objec-
tive attributes, such as high quality, does not determine but significantly constrain the dynamics
of popularity. It further details attributes which preserve their strong role in the valuation process.
83
4.1 Introduction
That has puzzled researchers for many years, to be able to predict which products are going to
become highly popular and which ones are going to fail. There have been studies comparing
product popularity to their objective attributes to be able to respond to this challenge. However,
it has been found in many cases, that product quality measures cannot be used as a perfect proxy
of higher popularity. For example, Hsu’s analysis of film ratings on the IMDB.com website found
that many films associated with lower quality oﬀerings through their multiple category membership
gained higher popularity than their single category competitors (Hsu, 2006c).
Recent studies shed light on the root of such seemingly counterintuitive results by finding evi-
dence that “social valuations are not fully constructed but are significantly constrained by objective
conditions” (Zuckerman, 2012, page 227.). Audience members draw their decisions on market prod-
ucts rarely in isolation from others. Relying on previous buyers’ judgments is especially amplified
in the modern web-based consumer world. Since the foundation of Amazon.com’s review system
the number of reviewer sites rose vastly, covering a wide range of organizations oﬀering their prod-
ucts and services. In sectors, where peer-influence is present and “individual decisions are subject
to social influence [...] there are inherent limits on the predictability of outcomes” (Salganik et al.,
2006, page 856.).
The MusicLab experiment of Salganik and colleague demonstrates that interpersonal influence
among audience members may become as strong that it diminishes the eﬀect of the product’s
true quality (Salganik et al., 2006; Salganik and Watts, 2008). Attention to the social influence
among decision makers oﬀers a new approach towards understanding the dynamics of product
popularity. This approach is in line with the sociologist argument, claiming that one cannot fully
understand any collective action without analyzing each participating member’s behavior, linking
the micro level inputs to the macro level outcome (Granovetter, 1978; Coleman, 1986). Outcomes
of collective action cannot be inferred from the counting of preferences, because very small changes
in them can lead to seemingly paradoxical outcomes.
Previous research has shown that once the eﬀect of social influence takes oﬀ, it leads to fur-
84
ther audience gain. This process has been referred to as cumulative advantage or Matthew eﬀect
(Merton et al., 1968; Merton, 1988; DiPrete and Eirich, 2006). These theories forecast that once a
product has reached a certain degree of popularity, it will continue to become even more popular.
The theory examines neither the role of product attributes in the process, nor it’s relation to the
ever-increasing popularity of certain products (Strang and Macy, 2001). The MusicLab experi-
ment provides evidence that product attributes play a significant role, but that role may change
dynamically in audience valuations with the increasing dominance of peer influence. Salganik and
colleague found that the evaluation of songs were diﬀerent when participants were shown the pop-
ularity ratings with comparison to an “unsocial” world, where they did not have information on
how popular the songs were among other participants (Salganik et al., 2006). Moreover when the
experimenters presented the inverse of the real popularity, they found that the new ratings did not
aﬀect the evaluation of outstanding songs, which continued to be received well in spite of their poor
rating. These findings indicate that peer influence indeed alters how audiences evaluate products
in some cases more heavily than in others. Salganik and Watts conclude that, “which particular
products turn out to be regarded as good or bad becomes increasingly unpredictable, whether unpre-
dictability is measured directly or in terms of quality” (Salganik et al., 2006, page 856.). I challenge
this remark, which paints a rather negative picture of the predictability of product success. There
have been studies demonstrating that in situations when there is no peer influence, product at-
tributes provide a good estimation of success. I argue that the role of certain product attributes
does not diminish fully, but changes in social valuation processes dependent on the strength of
peer influence.
Peer influence may be of various natures and may not be active under diﬀerent conditions
(Zuckerman, 2012). I focus on social influence with complete anonymity, where audience members
don’t know each other, they only know the decision outcomes of other members. This condition
is widely present especially in online markets1. Most of the review sites, such as Amazon, Yelp
or TripAdvisor, recommendation systems such as Imdb and crowdfunding sites like Indiegogo,
1Zhang (2010) is introducing another very interesting market, where audience members base their decisions on
the judgement of their unknown peers’. Analyzing the US kidney market she finds that refusion of a transplant
kidney increases future refusals of the same donor kidney.
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DonorsChoose and Kickstarter works on the basis of anonymity.
In particular my setting is creative projects on the crowdfunding market. I collected data
from the Kickstarter.com crowdfunding website. On this website creators raise money for their
creative projects through crowdfunding. Crowdfunding refers to the method where the producer
collects small to medium size investment without any financial intermediaries (Ordanini, 2009).
The special feature of this setting is that one can collect information on not only the producer side
but also the audience side and of the product itself. The website publishes the project creator’s
previous funding and founder activities within the community; it also keeps track of every project
backer, their geographical location, and their previous donations; and finally the website publishes
each project in great detail about the project’s intended goal, the project’s special features, and
about the risks and challenges involved in the project execution. On the Kickstarter website I
followed the daily progress of more than 5000 projects, which started between the period of 1st
and 31st March 2015. I continued the data collection until 1st March and 28th June 2015 - when
the last project endedI draw conclusions on the role of project attributes in the dynamics of social
valuations building on a dual analysis.
First, I compare how much early backers rely on information of the project when deciding about
the donation in contrast to late backers. Borrowing from the threshold model I define early backers
by their low threshold, while late backers will be defined by their high threshold (Granovetter,
1978; Valente, 1996; Granovetter and Soong, 1983, 1986). Threshold model is proposed to study
situations where only binary choices are present such as leaving the neighborhood or not, buying a
product or not, or funding a project or not. In the core of the model lies the interdependence among
individual choices. Each individual makes their own choice depending on the number of others who
choose before them. Everyone therefore has a threshold for the choice adoption. In short, one’s
choice of behavior is a function of others’ (Schelling, 1971, 1972; Squazzoni, 2008; Granovetter,
1978; Granovetter and Soong, 1983, 1986). I use the sequence of backers to measure the individual
thresholds. Low threshold individuals fund projects early. They are the ones who are willing to
take higher risks. I expect that once high threshold individuals enter the funding it signals higher
popularity, which in turn signals lowered risks and attracts further audience. Respectively, I define
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early backers, as those members who donate to the project when there is no or very small eﬀect
of social influence present while late backers enter their donation when the eﬀect of peer influence
is stronger. I argue that the decision-making situation of early audience is markedly diﬀerent,
as these members cannot infer quality information from others’ previous behavior. I hypothesize
that early backers decide about the project’s worthiness of the donations more strongly based
on its objective quality, rather then relying on information about the progress of the project.
The regression analysis of the full profile of over 130 thousand backers who were donating money
towards 5243 projects demonstrates that early backers choose projects with matching geographic
location, with higher typicality, with more experienced project founders, with more detailed project
introduction, and projects associated with less risk and projects which are open for a longer funding
period. Further results shed light on the diﬀerences in audience compound between early and late
audience. In accordance with the hypothesis, low threshold individuals are more strongly influenced
by project attributes than by their peers in their valuations.
Second, I analyze how the role of project attributes change in shaping the overall valuations
of creative projects as the eﬀect of social influence increases. To describe the dynamics of the
popularity of projects proposed for crowdfunding I use negative binomial regression where I predict
the number of daily backers. To account for the magnitude of social influence I use the number of
previous backers prior to the focal day. In accordance with previous research I also find evidence
for peer influence. Overall, I find that the role of project attributes decrease or fully disappear
when controlling for the eﬀect of social influence. The results indicate that project location and
it’s typicality become less relevant information in the valuation process, while the project’s current
popularity becomes a more relevant basis of decision. Attributes, like the projects goal amount
and it’s duration, keep their significant role at a somewhat decreased level. Further, investigating
the interaction between the eﬀect of social influence and project attributes I find that under the
condition of increased peer influence, the pure eﬀect of project attributes diminish further. For
example, the negative relation between higher project goal and popularity turns around with the
growing group of backers.
Analyzing how constraints external to the product itself alter the dynamics of its popularity, I
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find that increased competition aﬀects negatively the project’s popularity even after accounting for
peer influence. This negative eﬀect however turns around as the project reaches a highly popular
state.
This research circumscribes the relation between social influence and social valuations con-
necting the micro level mechanism with its macro level consequences. The backer level analysis
demonstrates that objective conditions constrain more audience members’ valuation early on, when
peer influence is weak. While on the project-level tI show how increasing social influence aﬀects
product popularity. The results suggest that with a better understanding of the role that social
influence plays in audience members’ valuations, one can make predictions of popularity based on
objective attributes with increased accuracy. This research also oﬀers empirical evidence of the
threshold model, which has been widely applied in simulation studies but much less on real life
observational data.
4.2 Theory and hypotheses
4.2.1 Social valuation and the MusicLab experiment
The recent experiment of Salganik and colleague (Salganik et al., 2006; Salganik and Watts, 2008)
draws the attention to the role of peer influence in product valuation.
In their study they created an internet based artificial “music market”, where participants rated
48 previously unknown songs from unknown bands. In the independent condition participants did
not have any information on other users’ prior ratings, while in the social influence condition par-
ticipants were aware of their peers valuations. They further specified the experimental conditions
using diﬀerent methods to transmit the information on previous ratings of other participants’,
such as introducing the most popular songs at the top of the list, sorting the songs randomly or
presenting the available songs in a grid rather than in a list format.
The results reiterate that social influence indeed plays a significant role in the process of social
evaluation. Further it decreases the predictability of outcomes. They find that the popularity
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ratings of the same set of songs were distinct when participants were rating them within the
diﬀerent conditions. They conclude therefore that “unpredictability is inherent to the process and
cannot be eliminated simply by knowing more about the songs or market participants” (Salganik
et al., 2006, page 856.)
There has been a growing amount of research pointing out the diﬃculty in forecasting popu-
larity due to the lack of systematic results. Earlier studies hypothesized that this unpredictability
stems from environmental changes (Peterson and Berger, 1971). Peterson and Berger label the
environment of the music industry as turbulent, as the styles and preferences of their mainly young
audience members follow rapid changes. This approach emphasizes the role audience members have
in understanding product success. Studies following this approach based their conclusion on an ag-
gregate level analysis of audience preferences. This approach is suﬃcient when audience members
don’t influence each others’ decisions, or the magnitude of that influence is negligible compared to
the magnitude of other, more controlled influences such as newspaper advertisements.
The sudden spread of new, internet based marketing techniques provide a less controlled en-
vironment for the emergence of social valuations. Amazon.com in 1995 introduced the possibility
for it’s users to write their personal opinion of books purchased on the website in the format of a
review. This feature of the website quickly become very popular, and other online sellers started
adopting the strategy. By now most sellers in product categories like books, electronics, games,
videos, music, beverages and wine (Chen and Xie, 2008) allow their customers to help their fellow
shoppers in the decision making process with sharing purchase experiences and quality valuations
with them. Several studies document that audience members heavily rely on product information
from their peers once it is available to them (Chevalier and Mayzlin, 2006; Liu, 2006). Given these
conditions audience members participate in social interaction even in spite of not knowing each
other personally, as they may reflect on each others previously made decisions. Individual pref-
erences therefore may be considered as a function of others’ previous decisions, where one acts -
either making the purchase or not - based on others’ previous actions. To conclude, once audience
members are provided with information on the decisions of their peers, the knowledge of which
may alter their own decision, they are participating in a collective action, even if the information
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is transmitted through the internet rather than through trusted acquaintances.
Sociologists have long argued that individual values and preferences cannot be concluded from
the aggregate outcomes (Granovetter, 1978; Coleman, 1986). Social values are the product of
social interaction (Merton, 1948, 1995). Individuals in social interaction may alter each others
decisions in ways that it is not consistent with their initial intentions. For example, one may prefer
film A over film B, but if film B receives more positive ratings the person may decided based on
the higher popularity of film B to watch that film in contrast to the initially preferred film A.
In order to understand why the given outcome developed, and not any other realization one has
to analyze each participating member’s behavior. Outcome of a collective action where people
may influence each others’ decision cannot be inferred from the counting of preferences, because
very small changes in them can lead to seemingly paradoxical outcomes. For example, after an
interesting and innovative presentation with a very good speaker everyone from the audience may
think it deserves an applaud. In the first variation one might go ahead and starts clapping. Soon
everyone else joins in. It is clear for everyone that the presentation was a great success. In the
second variation of the same situation no one goes ahead to start clapping. In this variation,
the success of the presentation is not implicit, where only one person changed their behavior from
clapping to not to clapping. This example demonstrates that it may be risky to conclude individual
attributes from the aggregate outcomes. Instead, following the sociologist tradition I attempt to
connect the micro level inputs of audience members’ behavior to the macro level outcome of
product valuations (Coleman, 1986). Mapping micro-macro linkages may help explain seemingly
counterintuitive results of low quality products achieving high popularity. Overall the MusicLab
experiment pinpoints the diﬃculties of concluding the determinants of product popularity under
the condition of social influence. It further demonstrates that certain product attributes carry a
significant role in audience members’ valuation processes also when peer influence is present. These
product attributes may further indicate the outcome of social valuations and product popularity.
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4.2.2 Social influence in audience members’ choices
In organizational theory the mainstream approach to studying audience choices mostly relied on
the analysis of diﬀerences between the individual preferences and attitudes towards the producer or
the product. For example Zuckerman studies the determinants of why stock market analysts would
decide for or against writing reviews about firms on the stock market based on the overall pattern of
reviews. He claimed that multiple industry firms are less appealing to specialized analysts as they
cannot transmit a clear identity (Zuckerman, 1999a). Hsu, accounting for the trade-oﬀ between
niche width and fitness, analyzes aggregate audience preferences towards films (Hsu, 2006c), while
Kovacs and Johnson claim that higher quality and more typical restaurants are more appealing
to their audience (Kovacs and Johnson, 2013). Such an approach however disregards the strength
of social forces that ones decision has on others2 and assumes that audience members make their
choices solely relying on information about the producer and in isolation from other members.
Accounting for the interdependence of decisions leads to a more precise understanding of the role
of product attributes in the emergence of popularity.
Social influence theory explains how people aﬀect each other’s decision by their action. Cumu-
lative advantage processes and the theory of Matthew eﬀect predict that once a high number of
audience is attracted and the eﬀect of social influence gets stronger it is more likely that further
audience members will join in the same decision. One cannot conclude from these theories how
audience members value products when there are no other members yet from whom they would be
able to infer quality information? There are studies demonstrating that the eﬀect of social influ-
ence may get as strong that it makes other eﬀects of product attributes disappear (Salganik et al.,
2006; Salganik and Watts, 2008; Koning and Model, 2013). Koning and Model (2013) found proof
in a natural experiment of the outweighing eﬀect of social influence. The authors invested $40 into
randomly selected projects proposed for crowdfunding on the DonorsChoose website. Their results
2There has been a massive line of social network research studying the social influences among related individ-
uals. Although, network theory is greatly concerned with the interconnectedness of individual decisions, the main
condition of network analysis is that individuals are related to each other. In the present study I analyze members of
a market, who have presumably no connection to each other, and who do not continue any communication between
each other.
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show that the success rate of those randomly selected projects into which they invested the initial
$40 boosts, significantly increased. These experiments, where authors decouple the eﬀect of social
influence from the eﬀect of objective product attributes are demonstrating that audience members’
influence on each others’ decision may be stronger than the eﬀect of objective product attributes.
Once we agree that audience perceptions are not pure functions of objective attributes the ques-
tion arises naturally, what the relationship between objective attributes and audience perception
is (Zuckerman, 2012). Why people make certain decisions even though no one made the same
decision before them? Why people buy certain products without being able to draw conclusions
from others’ purchases? And how they decide about which product to choose? To answer these
questions I use the threshold model.
4.2.3 Threshold model of interdependent decisions
Schelling described the phenomenon of neighborhood segregation by race, a question, which gained
high visibility throughout the 60ies of America, through threshold model. He studied the problem
of segregation from a collective behavior perspective. He found that every resident has a compo-
sition preference with respect to race of their neighborhood. This is what he called the threshold.
Respectively, residents stay until the threshold is not reached. Once the the number of neighbors
from the undesired race reach the threshold, residents decide to move to another location. The
model demonstrates first, that residents base their action on other member’s previous actions, and
second, that small changes in the individual preferences may lead to full segregation in the local
society (Schelling, 1971).
The model Schelling introduced, generally applies to those collective situations where actors
are faced with binary decision. The model’s main goal is to investigate the interdependence among
decisions, namely how each member’s decision depends on everyone else’s decision (Granovetter,
1978). For example, one might buy a product only if others have already bought the same product.
How many others the person needs to see before choosing to buy the same product is going to be
described by the threshold. A person has a low threshold if they are amongst the first to buy the
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product. High threshold people are defined by those purchasing products only after many others
have already done so, in other words, when the product has already established a certain level of
popularity. Each individual in the analysis makes their own choice depending on the number of
others who choose before them. Everyone therefore has a threshold for the choice adoption and the
model predicts the aggregate outcome based on the initial distribution of individual thresholds. In
short, one’s choice of behavior is a function of others’ behavior. The model’s underlying condition
is that audience members are uncertain about the relative quality of the various products, therefore
they infer quality information from its popularity (Gould, 2002; Lynn et al., 2009).
The model has several criteria. Firstly, individuals are presented with mutually exclusive
choice decisions, where the costs and benefits of the chosen outcome are a function of the number
of others who made the same decision. This condition is present in internet based purchases
and reviewer sites where audience members decide between buying a product or not, or between
writing a review or not. In the context of creative project funding for example, the risk of investing
in the project is decreasing by the increasing number of other investors. Secondly, the model
presupposes that decision makers are behaving rationally in the sense of trying to maximize their
utility and that they have complete information on the other’s decision’s outcome (Granovetter,
1978). Rational individuals have the motive to pay attention to others’ decisions as they may
have limited information at hand or may not be able to make sense of all the available information
(Watts, 2002). Third, to be able to trace how one’s action influences someone else’s behavior the
model assumes that decisions are sequential. Although, real life decisions do not necessarily fulfill
this condition, on the one hand it allows us to study the interdependence among decisions (Oliver
et al., 1985) and on the other hand the realization of internet based purchases, ratings and reviews,
happening in well traceable time sequence.
One shortcoming of the model is that it takes the individual thresholds taken for granted and
does not oﬀer a clear understanding of why audience members have lower or higher thresholds. The
model’s main focus is on describing the eﬀect of the individual thresholds on the aggregate level.
From the perspective of understanding why some products become highly popular, one needs to
analyze the basis of threshold choices. Individual thresholds signal ones attitude towards product
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purchase decision.
4.2.4 Relationship between product attributes and individual thresh-
olds
There has been a great number of studies concerned with the understanding of the outcome of
collective action since the seminal work of Olson (1965). Collective action theorists typically
try to develop formal tools to describe the dynamics of collective action and try to identify the
factors which determine the outcome (Oliver, 1993). Some of these studies are directly concerned
with the eﬀect of participant attributes on the collective behavior outcome. For example, critical
mass theory emphasizes the significant role of those actors who behave diﬀerently from typical
group members (Oliver et al., 1985; Oliver and Marwell, 1988; Marwell et al., 1988; Prahl et al.,
1991; Marwell and Oliver, 1993). Marwell et al. (1988) find that group heterogeneity early on
accelerates the dynamics of collective action and leads to success. However there is much less
interest in understanding the eﬀects of the subject of collective behavior in its dynamics. Social
movement studies are reporting that stronger opinion about the subject matter leads to a more
predictable action (Oliver et al., 1985; Opp, 1988; Walsh and Warland, 1983).
To describe audience members product valuations from a collective behavior perspective re-
quires the extension to understand how product attributes influence audience members’s decision.
Valente (1996), analyzing the adoption the new drug Tetracycline in Illinois (Original study:
Coleman et al., 1966), the adoption of hybrid corn and the adoption of family planning, finds
that the first adopters were most exposed to further information on the product attributes. In
his study the group of early adopters consisted of those doctors who were subscribers to the most
medical journals, the earliest adopters of planting hybrid corn were those farmers who visited most
often the nearest large city and the first adopters of family planning were those Korean women
who experienced the most national family planning campaigns. Conversely, later adopters with
high threshold were exposed less to other information sources about the subject matter. Studies
of innovation diﬀusion build on the threshold concept to categorize audience members into groups
94
depending on their attitude towards innovation (Valente, 1995, 1996; Strang and Soule, 1998;
Van Braak, 2001; Rogers, 2010). These studies are concerned with the role of personal attitudes
in social influence where the participating members are directly connected to each other. However
it helps formulating the hypothesis about the role of product attributes in personal thresholds in
settings where peer influence is not direct.
Valente (1996) finds that early audience members are less prone to make their decisions based
on other’s decision, as is also indicated by their low threshold. Early participants face higher risks
at the time of decision. As the number of participants is increasing the risk of participation is
decreasing. The increased risk in early participation may force them to rely more on information
about the product. This leads to the expectation that early audience members value products on
the bases of their objective attributes. The eﬀect of product attributes therefore will be a stronger
indicator for low threshold participants. Conversely, the eﬀect of product attributes decreases as
the product becomes more popular.
Hypothesis 1: As the threshold of the backer increases the eﬀect of product attributes diminishes.
4.2.5 Relation between social influence and objective conditions
While in the previous section I argue that audience members value products diﬀerently depending
on the level of peer influence, here I theorize about the macro-level outcome of this diﬀerence in
evaluation. On a micro-level, I argue that early audience members evaluate products based on its
objective attributes. But as the group of audience members increases, the process of valuation
changes, which makes it diﬃcult to conclude the overall evaluation of the product. In the MusicLab
and in the DonorsChoose experiments (I introduced above in more detail), the authors demonstrate
that once audience members are aware of each others’ decisions, it indeed led to diﬀerent overall
product evaluation, compared to audience members who have no information about each others’
behavior (Salganik et al., 2006; Salganik and Watts, 2008; Koning and Model, 2013). The process
unfolds in the following way: As more people participate in the group, it signals a stronger positive
95
quality, which further increases the number of audience members participating with high threshold.
In spite of the conclusion of Salganik et al. (2006), which states that it is impossible to predict the
outcome of social valuation, their findings provide evidence, that in some cases, the outcome can be
predicted on the basis of objectivity. In the MusicLab experiment, comparing songs which received
outstandingly good or bad overall ratings, they find that these songs keep their ratings even in
spite of an increasing level of peer influence. This result suggests, that objective conditions do
indeed play a significant role in the process of social evaluations. However the level of significance
may change due to the dynamics of social influence.
Proceeding from the first hypothesis I argue that the significance of objective conditions will
decrease with the increasing force of social influence.
Hypothesis 2: As the number of backers increases the eﬀect of product attributes decreases.
4.3 Empirical setting
4.3.1 Crowdfunding
My empirical setting is the domain of crowdfunding. One special feature of crowdfunding is to get
the “ordinary” audience involved. Audience obtains community-based experiences through visibly
participating in a project investment (Belleflamme et al., 2014) providing a unique setting, which
allows us to study a two-sided market, the audience behavior and preferences; and matching those
to the producer behavior. Another specificity of the crowdfunding domain is that audience does
not rely on expert opinion, rather they make individual choices about which project they wish to
invest in. I use data from the Kickstarter.com website where creators raise money for their creative
projects through crowdfunding. Crowdfunding refers to the method where the producer collects
small to medium size investments without any financial intermediaries (Ordanini, 2009).
The idea of crowdfunding stems from a broader concept of crowdsourcing, turning to the
crowd with specific requests, such as collecting feedbacks or solutions to problems in order to
help entrepreneurial activities (Kleemann et al., 2008). The crowd of people who wish to support
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the producer may also co-produce the output, select and sometimes develop the oﬀers they deem
to be most promising or interesting (Ordanini, 2009). Crowdfunders recruit their investors via
the Internet, mostly through specialized websites like Kickstarter.com (Belleflamme et al., 2014).
Although founding is possible in several diﬀerent ways, such as loan or pre-ordering, the project
owners on the Kickstarter website are asking for investments.
The significance of crowdfunding strongly increased in recent years both in terms of the numer-
ous business sectors to which it is applied (Agrawal et al., 2011; Belleflamme et al., 2014) and in
terms of value of the transactions (Lawton and Marom, 2010). The entrepreneurial sectors where
crowdfunding as a source of capital entered were mostly related to creative work, for example
the first American crowdfunding site ArtistShare was created in the year 2000. Musicians on the
Sellaband website have been raising money to record their albums’ since 2006 and three years later
Kickstarter.com started fundraising for creative projects. By 2012 there had been 452 crowdfund-
ing sites according to the Crowdsourcing.org’s Directory of Sites, conquering other business sectors
such as software, food and sport industry, becoming a more and more powerful source of funding
for small ventures.
According to the 2014 summary of Kickstarter.com, in that year, over 3.3 million backers -
people who donate money towards the project - from nearly every country pledged a total of $529
million and successfully funded 22,252 projects. Within one year, creators of design projects, the
category receiving the most donations, raised $97 million. On the March 12 2014, backers donated
almost $400,000 within one hour (www.Kickstarter.com/year/2014/data). The significance of
crowdfunding can’t be measured just in terms of money. Two years earlier, in 2012, 19 movies at
the Sundance film festival were funded through the Kickstarter website, four winning top prices
and one nominated for an Oscar next to its numerous other successes. To better understand the
empirical setting, below I summarize the specificities of the data.
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4.3.2 Kickstarter.com
On the Kickstarter.com website people propose creative projects for the purpose of collecting
funding. Each project is assigned to one of the following fifteen categories: art; comics; crafts;
dance; design; fashion; film and video; food; games; journalism; music; photography; publishing;
technology; theater. Prospective backers can acquire further information from the projects intro-
duction page. This page contains a series of information such as the title, detailed description of
the project which may contain photos and videos and a short discussion of the possible risks and
challenges. There is a possibility for the creator to publish the project on their Facebook page for
higher publicity and to insert a link pointing to the oﬃcial website of the project. Each project
has a deadline, which is the final date when the project stops collecting donations. If the project
reaches the target amount by the deadline, the creator will receive the total amount of funding. In
case the project is not successful in raising its target amount, any money oﬀered for donation will
not be transferred to the project creator and the project fails to receive funding. The maximum
allowed duration of any project on Kickstarter.com is 60 days.
The project page on Kickstarter also allows the creator to publish information about themselves,
such as their name, the number of previously created projects, the location and the number
projects they themselves previously sponsored. The website constantly updates how much money
is donated so far to the project, the number of backers who made the donation, and the number
of days left before the fund-raising project ends. There are ways in which the creator can try to
engage more audience and show their own commitment towards the project. For example, they
can write updates throughout the duration of the project as well as provide answers to questions
and comments left about the project.
A project is considered successful when it raises the goal amount within the predetermined
period. In this case the total amount of the donations (even if it exceeds the target amount) gets
transferred to the creator. If the target amount is not raised by the end of the predetermined
period, the backings are not executed into actual donations and the creator receives no funding for
their project. In such a case the fundraising project is deemed unsuccessful and the money remains
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Figure 4.1: Illustration of the project introduction page
with the backers. Therefore backers make the actual donation only if the project raises the target
amount thus turning out to be successful (see Figure 4.1 for a snippet of a project introduction
page).
Data from the Kickstarter website is suitable for testing the threshold model as the site publishes
the number of backers instantly on the project page, allowing us to study the sequence of audience’s
decision. Each member can assess the number of other participants before deciding about their
own participation.
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Data
I have followed 6965 projects on the Kickstarter.com website between the period of 1st March
2015 and 31th May 2015, meeting the criteria that the project started between 1st March and
31st March. From the final dataset I have omitted several projects for the following reasons a) the
project has been cancelled by the creator or the project has been terminated by the website for
the reason that it is subject of an intellectual property dispute (5 projects); b) the creator of the
project introduces the project purely with the use of images rather than text, making it impossible
to compare how typical a project is to the other projects in the same category as there is no project
textual description from which to gather this information (36 projects)3; or the project goal was
defined in currencies other than US dollar (1681 projects)4. The final sample contains all project
attributes, the daily changes in the number of backers and pledged amount, and the full text of
the project descriptions of 5,243 projects. I also collected information on the backers’ of these
projects. The data file contains 133,484 backing instances, made by 132,778 individual backers. I
collected information on the location, the backing sequence, and the project categories for which
these backers were donating money previously.
To describe the micro and macro level processes and their relation to each other I build two
separate analysis, one on the backer-level and another on the project-level.
4.4 Backer-level analysis
4.4.1 Variables
To analyze the relationship between product attributes and individual thresholds, I create a backer-
level dataset. This dataset contains 3 types of information, a) backer specific information, b)
project specific information and c) information on the project’s progress. In case a backer has
3Comparing the distributions of the analyzed and omitted projects I found that the omitted projects do not
diﬀer from those, which are included in the final sample.
4The Kickstarter.com website is initiated from the US, New York, and started expanding to other countries only
in recent years. The site mainly appeals to US-based projects and backers, however the number of projects based in
other countries grows continuously. To reduce the eﬀect of unobserved heterogeneity I omit projects with non-USD
currencies.
100
multiple backing instances within the data collection period, I take the mean value of these in-
stances across the diﬀerent variables5.
Backer threshold is the main outcome variable. I measure the individual threshold by the
sequence of backing instances. The website lists all the backers who contributed to the project in
descending order of the date and time of their contribution. I use this list to acquire the individual
threshold. Further backer specific data are the backer location, the backing frequency, and the
backing attitude. I distinguish between backers from the US and backers from outside of the US
(Backer from US). This information is readily available from the website. I separate backers who
donated to more than one project within the 13 weeks data collection period. I define this group
of backers as frequent backers.
I describe backing attitude with two variables. Firstly, I create the measure of focused identity,
which diﬀerentiates between snobs and omnivores, the terms used by Peterson and Kern (1996)
. I define backers with focused identity as those members of the community, who back projects
mainly in one or a few categories in contrast to those backers who contribute to projects in many
categories. To define how focused someone is, I count the number of categories to which the
person had allocated donations previously and divide it by the total number of categories. The
measure will indicate focused identity when the value is low (for example if a person donates to
projects within the photography and art categories out of the 15 diﬀerent categories, she will have a
2/15=0.13) in contrast to a value close to one. Secondly, I measure one’s devotion to the categories.
I name this variable as category enthusiasm, which shows the proportion of one’s backings across
the categories. For example, one might contribute to six projects in total, two photography and
four art projects, which will indicate higher enthusiasm for art projects (4/6=0.66) and lower
enthusiasm for photography projects (2/6=0.33). To create the above measures I used two pieces of
information available on the backer profile: the total number of previous backings and distribution
of these backing across the project categories. Although, these two attitude measures are similar
to one another, they both contribute diﬀerently towards the understanding of backing behavior.
5Within the data collection period I observed 14,363 backers multiple times. Backers, who donated to more than
one project constitute 11% of all the backers in the data.
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While someone might be generally open to many diﬀerent categories, the person may still show
stronger preference towards one or few categories.
As the last backer specific variable, I include the number of previous backings.This is to account
for the magnitude of one’s general activity on the website (previous backing count).
To include variables accounting for project characteristics, I use information published on the
project introduction page. I use two indicators of the magnitude of the project, a) the goal amount
(measured in US dollars) and b) the project duration (measured in the number of days). I employ
several quality indicators: a) the lengths of the project description (description length: measured
by the logarithmic count of the number of words in the description text) and b) the length of the
introduction of the possible risks (risks length - measured by the log count number of words in the
introduction of the project’s risks and challenges), c) whether the project has a video introduction,
or d) a link to the oﬃcial website (both dummy variables). These variables signal the time spent
with creating the project. For example, writing a long description or creating a video is a lengthy
task, which reflects the creator’s invested energy. The oﬃcial website may indicate the trueness of
the project, while fewer risks also reflects higher quality.
I include data on the number of previously proposed projects by the same creator to control for
the creator’s experience. The creator has the possibility to use a Facebook link which automatically
publishes her project on her Facebook account. I collect information on the number of Facebook
friends who may be reached via this advertising method. Further, I control for geographic eﬀects
including a dummy variable with the value of one if the project was initiated from the US, and zero
otherwise (project from US ). The last project specific variable is the project typicality. Project
typicality measures the distance between the project in question and the prototypical project of
the category. The minimum value of the typicality is going to vary between zero and one, where
the value is going to approach one when the project is a more typical member of the category, and
it is going to approach zero, if the project is a less typical member (for more detailed discussion of
the typicality measure, see Kovacs and Johnson, 2013). To illustrate the diﬀerence between high
and low typicality I chose two projects from the art category. Project A with the title “Prolific
NYC artist needs funding for upcoming exhibition” is created by a painter who is raising money
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to cover the costs of his exhibition. This project has a relatively high typicality score. Project B
received the title “Play on words” from it’s creator, who is collecting money for making a picture
book with illustrations of words and phrases in the english language. This project is a less typical
one among all the art projects. Figure 4.2 shows the distribution of typicality among projects.
To diﬀerentiate between weather the backer donates to projects from a specific location or
projects from local to them, I create two variables. The same country dummy variable indicates if
the backer is from the same country as the project, while the same city dummy variable accounts
for the similarity between the projects and the backers city.
The dataset contains project progress information. I include the number of backers who con-
tributed to the project by the focal day, the percentage of the goal amount already raised (percent
raised) and the number of days passed from the total project duration (day sequence).
Finally, I include a set of dummy variables to control for unobserved heterogeneity across
project categories.
See Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 for descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations.
4.4.2 Results
I study the relationship between product attributes and individual thresholds throughout the
project duration using the linear regression model. The result in Table 4.3 presents two models.
In both models the outcome variable is the threshold of the backer. As the variable is a continuous
measure of the backing sequence, the coeﬃcients are demonstrating how characteristics of the
project relate to the time of the donation. Here I talk about the time of donation with respect
to the number of previous adopters and not with respect to real time. Low threshold individuals
donate early, in the sense that there are not many others who donated before them. In real time
there still may be a big gap between the donations, or, on the contrary, the donations may follow
each other in close succession.
The two models diﬀer in their number of observations. While in the first model I include
every backer who donated at least once throughout the data collection period, I restrict the second
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Figure 4.2: Distribution of typicality (cumulative count)
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Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics of the backer profile
Mean StdDev
1) Threshold 485.306 950.73
2) Backer from US 0.314 0.463
3) Frequent backer 0.108 0.31
4) Focused identity 0.374 0.178
5) Category enthusiasm 0.26 0.211
6) Previous backing count 26.739 57.022
7) Goal (log) 10.109 1.401
8) Duration (days) 31.975 8.746
9) Description length (log) 6.627 0.795
10) Risks length (log) 4.779 0.774
11) Website 0.95 0.213
12) Video 0.959 0.194
13) Creator experience 1.841 3.183
14) Facebook friends (log) 2.272 2.478
15) Project from US 0.948 0.213
16) Typicality 0.199 0.066
17) Number of backers 582.574 1005.672
18) Percent raised 1.147 2.001
19) Day sequence 7.517 10.914
20) Same country 0.057 0.226
21) Same city 0.02 0.137
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Table 4.3: Linear regression analysis on the backer threshold
(1) (2)
BackerFromUS -103.461*** -90.704***
(4.752) (14.558)
MultipleBackings 214.196***
(6.803)
FocusedIdentity -336.774*** -562.222***
(17.762) (56.538)
CategoryEnthusiasm -387.008*** -639.617***
(15.956) (53.162)
PreviousBackingCount -0.807*** -0.668***
(0.038) (0.053)
GoalLog 242.154*** 473.661***
(1.902) (9.125)
DurationDays -10.358*** -25.700***
(0.252) (1.365)
DescriptionLength 56.966*** 178.989***
(3.126) (18.583)
RisksLength 46.024*** 259.255***
(3.123) (16.849)
Video -44.212*** 193.933***
(10.877) (63.085)
WebSite -64.864*** 252.018***
(9.299) (51.993)
CreatorExperience -11.304*** -16.574***
(0.685) (1.855)
FbFriendsLog -21.401*** -44.781***
(0.824) (3.501)
ProjectFromUS 154.074*** 594.498***
(9.02) (40.861)
Typicality -97.923* -354.891
(57.945) (304.809)
NumberOfBackers 0.322*** 0.029*
(0.003) (0.015)
PercentRaised 46.053*** 73.362***
(1.132) (5.137)
DaySequence 19.757*** 65.335***
(0.193) (0.92)
SameCountry -51.677*** 1.525
(10.816) (46.999)
SameCity 68.958*** 48.312
(16.891) (77.936)
Category dummies included Yes Yes
Constant -2,613.695*** -7,665.316***
(27.144) (189.92)
Observations 133,484 14,363
R2 0.479 0.722
Adjusted 0.479 0.721
Residual Std. Error 686.414 (df = 133449) 782.333 (df = 14329)
F statistic 3,606.647*** (df = 34; 133449) 1,127.978*** (df = 33; 14329)
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
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model to those backers, whom I observe multiple times. To account for any possible diﬀerences
between backers observed single or multiple times I include a control dummy variable in the second
model, which has a value of one if the backer donated money to more than one project within the
observation period. The coeﬃcient estimates are similar through the two models, therefore I will
focus on the results of the first model and I will highlight only the diﬀerences.
I start the investigation with describing the relationship between backer attributes and their
threshold. As the negative and significant coeﬃcient estimate demonstrates, backers from outside
the US tend to donate earlier to projects. Analyzing the relationship between backing attitude and
individual threshold I find that backers who allocate their contributions across many categories
but show increased enthusiasm for the project’s category, tend to donate earlier. Also, backers
who donated to a high number of projects previously, tend to take higher risks.
Analyzing the relationship between project attributes and threshold I find that individual
threshold increases with the magnitude of the project. Higher goal and longer duration attracts
audience with high threshold. Similarly, projects with long description and many challenges are
more appealing to high threshold backers.
Signaling higher quality with the inclusion of a video clip and link to the oﬃcial website will
increase the tendency to contributing earlier to the project. Experienced creators with a lot of
Facebook friends have similar eﬀect on backer threshold. Higher level of typicality is also more
appealing to low threshold backers. Comparing the coeﬃcient estimates in the two models I find
that the eﬀect of typicality has lost it’s significance.
Backers tend to contribute later to US-located projects, which indicates the positive and signif-
icant coeﬃcient estimate. While donating to projects which are in the same country is important
for low threshold backers, donating to projects which are located in the same city is increasing the
individual threshold. This relationship is also somewhat diﬀerent when analyzing only frequent
backers. Backers tend to donate later to projects located in the same country.
The three progress variables are showing the expected results, projects which attracted more
audience before the focal day, which are closer to the end of the project period, and which have
raised a higher percentage of the goal amount attract more audience members with higher thresh-
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olds.
Backers who contribute frequently to projects generally tend to contribute later, as it is shown
in the first model. This might explain the diﬀerences between the two models.
4.5 Project-level analysis
4.5.1 Variables
I include three types of variable in the project-level analysis, where the outcome variable is the
daily popularity of the project which I measure with the number of backers who donate to the
project on the focal day (Daily backers).
Firstly, I include a set of attribute measures to be able to follow the change in the role objective
attributes with increasing project popularity. Secondly, I include measures of the project dynamics.
Thirdly, I include external controls of market competition.
I collect attribute information on each project from the project’s page. As I use the same
variables in the backer-level dataset, here I will only list them up in order to avoid repetition.
I include the project goal, duration, the introduction lengths and the lengths of the description
of possible risks, weather the project has a video introduction or an oﬃcial website, the use of
the Facebook link, project typicality, creator experience, and the creator’s activity within the
community. I further distinguish between projects initiated in the US, versus projects initiated
outside of the US to control for possible diﬀerences due to the geographical location.
To follow the projects’ progress, I include several variables in the dataset. I account for the
day sequence, which has a value of one on the day of the project launch and the highest value
per project is equal to the project’s duration. To capture how close the project is to it’s closing I
calculate how much time has passed from the whole project duration (time passed %). I measure
the strength of social influence by the total number of backers who had donated money up to the
focal day. To exclude the possibility that the experienced popularity is due to other, non social
but material eﬀects I include a variable showing the pledged amount. One could argue that the
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pledged amount drives popularity in contrast to peer influence, the alternative argument of which
needs to be falsified. An alternative measure of the eﬀect of the total donated amount would be
the percentage raised of the target amount.
I employ variables which are external to the project itself, namely measures of market competi-
tion. The number of new projects on the website accounts for the intensity of market competition,
while I also control for category specific competition, counting the number of new projects within
each category.
I include further control variables. Backing activity might be connected to the type of day,
such that people are more likely to donate during weekdays, rather than at weekends. Similar
results were published on the Kickstarter.com’s yearly statistics webpage. Therefore, I include a
dummy variable for separating weekdays from the weekends (Weekend). I also control for project
success and finally, I include a set of dummy variables for each category. See Table 4.4 and Table
4.5 for descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations.
4.5.2 Results
I model the change in the daily popularity of creative projects proposed for funding over a thirteen
week period. I analyze the dual eﬀect of project characteristics and social influence to disentangle
the dynamics of social evaluation. The form of my data is a time-series panel with a non-negative
integer dependent variable. As the dispersion parameter of the daily backers exceeds one6, the
most suitable method of analysis is the negative binomial regression, where the unit of analysis
is the daily changes in the funding activity. Figure 4.3 shows the frequency distribution of the
number of daily backers.
6Following standard econometrics routine, I define dispersion as the ratio of the variance to the mean.
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Table 4.4: Descriptive statistics of the project profile
Mean StdDev
1) DailyBackers 46.591 205.986
2) TotalBackers (log) 4.402 3.113
3) AmountDonated (log) 4.004 3.31
4) PercentRaised 0.387 0.079
5) Successful 0.173 0.378
6) DaySequence 19.222 13.306
7) TimePassed (%) 0.505 0.29
8) Weekend 0.285 0.451
9) ProjectLaunch-Weekend 0.16 0.366
10) Goal (log) 8.919 1.713
11) Duration (days) 38.031 12.781
12) DescriptionLength (log) 5.611 1.007
13) RisksLength (log) 4.258 0.844
14) Website 0.694 0.461
16) Video 0.775 0.418
17) FbFriends 0.466 0.499
18) Typicality 0.162 0.07
19) CreatorExperience 1.143 0.964
20) ProjectFromUS 0.946 0.226
21) CreatorActivity 7.336 16.623
22) NoNewProjects 276.864 84.86
23) NoNewProjectsWithinCat. 26.692 14.142
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Figure 4.3: Frequency distribution of number of daily backers
Table 4.6: Negative binomial regression on the project’s daily popularity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NumBackersLog 1.079*** 1.131*** 1.144*** 0.993***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.046)
AmmountPledgedLog -0.079*** -0.104*** 0.072***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.015)
PercentRaised 0.414*** 0.655***
(0.027) (0.027)
Akaike Inf. Crit. 612,864.100 575,300.500 575,152.200 575,093.100 574,354.400
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Successful 0.816*** 0.178*** 0.327*** 0.198*** 0.335***
(0.035) (0.028) (0.03) (0.031) (0.032)
DaySequence 0.006* -0.0004 -0.002 -0.002 0.018**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007)
TimePassedPercent -2.151*** -2.522*** -2.421*** -2.502*** -4.649***
(0.13) (0.114) (0.114) (0.114) (0.29)
Weekend -0.640*** -0.606*** -0.616*** -0.619*** -0.511***
(0.027) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.056)
CountryUS -0.137** -0.021 (0.02 -0.02 (0.095
(0.053) (0.045) -0.045) (0.045) (0.11)
ProjectStartWeekend -0.160*** -0.246*** -0.249*** -0.254*** -0.339***
(0.047) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.092)
GoalLog -0.047*** 0.019*** 0.002 0.017** -0.029**
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.013)
DurationDays -0.021*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.019***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
DescriptionWordCountLog 0.231*** -0.025* 0.004 0.006 0.033
(0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.029)
RisksWordCountLog 0.124*** -0.007 0.006 0.008 0.039
(0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.032)
HasWebSite 0.168*** -0.042* -0.022 -0.021 0.078
(0.028) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.051)
HasVideo 0.162*** -0.252*** -0.219*** -0.219*** -0.430***
(0.03) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.051)
HasFacebookLink 0.012 -0.034 -0.029 -0.027 0.011
Akaike Inf. Crit. 612,864.100 575,300.500 575,152.200 575,093.100 574,354.400
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(0.025) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.049)
Typicality 1.920*** -0.128 0.089 0.07 -0.095
(0.304) (0.265) (0.265) (0.265) (0.476)
CreatorExperience 0.039*** 0.035*** 0.037*** 0.031*** 0.03
(0.013) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.046)
CreatorCommunityBelongingness 0.003*** -0.001 0.0004 0.0003 0.005*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
NoNewProjects -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.003***
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0005)
NoNewProjectsInSameCategory -0.004** -0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.006**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
NumBackersLog:AmmountPledgedLog -0.039***
(0.002)
NumBackersLog:DaySequence -0.003***
(0.001)
NumBackersLog:TimePassedPercent 0.356***
(0.046)
NumBackersLog:Weekend -0.023***
(0.009)
NumBackersLog:CountryUS 0.014
(0.017)
NumBackersLog:ProjectStartWeekend 0.01
(0.015)
NumBackersLog:GoalLog 0.019***
(0.002)
Akaike Inf. Crit. 612,864.100 575,300.500 575,152.200 575,093.100 574,354.400
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NumBackersLog:DurationDays 0.0001
(0.001)
NumBackersLog:DescriptionWordCountLog -0.003
(0.005)
NumBackersLog:RisksWordCountLog -0.005
(0.005)
NumBackersLog:HasWebSite -0.019**
(0.009)
NumBackersLog:HasVideo 0.042***
(0.009)
NumBackersLog:HasFacebookLink -0.006
(0.008)
NumBackersLog:Typicality 0.038
(0.073)
NumBackersLog:CreatorExperience 0.001
(0.007)
NumBackersLog:CreatorCommunityBelongingness -0.001
(0.0004)
NumBackersLog:NoNewProjects 0.0002**
(0.0001)
NumBackersLog:NoNewProjectsInSameCategory -0.001**
(0.0004)
Category dummies included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 3.524*** -0.662*** -1.097*** -1.191*** -0.512*
(0.151) (0.128) (0.134) (0.134) (0.278)
Akaike Inf. Crit. 612,864.100 575,300.500 575,152.200 575,093.100 574,354.400
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Observations 161,052 161,052 161,052 161,052 161,052
Log Likelihood -306,399.100 -287,616.300 -287,541.100 -287,510.500 -287,123.200
theta 0.044*** 0.078*** 0.078*** 0.078*** 0.079***
(0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Note:*p<0.1;**p<0.05;***p<0.01
Akaike Inf. Crit. 612,864.100 575,300.500 575,152.200 575,093.100 574,354.400
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The first model in Table 4.6 introduces the eﬀect of all variables on the number of daily backers
apart from the main explanatory variables.
I start with analyzing the relationship between the project’s daily appeal and it’s characteristics.
In Model 1 both variables which are controlling for the project’s relative volume have a negative
eﬀect on the number of daily backers. Longer projects aiming to collect more money tend to
attract less audience. Certain characteristics of the way the project is introduced also influence
daily popularity. Longer, more detailed introduction increases the appeal, while audience members
value positively if the creator proposes all the possible risks and challenges the project may have
to overcome. Including a short video clip to the project introduction page to enrich the ways of
presenting the main goal of the project or presenting a link to the project’s oﬃcial website both
have a positive eﬀect on the number of daily backers. Projects with high typicality value, also
attract a higher number of daily backers.
Audience members may draw conclusions of the project by information about the creator.
Creators advertising their project to Facebook friends bears no significant improvement on daily
popularity. The creator’s past experience in proposing projects and her activity on the webpage
attracts more audience members, however the eﬀect size remains modest.
The negative and significant coeﬃcient estimate indicates, that projects, which are initiated in
the US are less appealing to their audience.
Investigating the relationship between market competition and project popularity, I find that
both increasing global and local competition decreases the project’s popularity. The increasing
number of new projects in the same category decreases the number of daily backers at a higher rate
than the increasing number of projects on the website, without consideration of their category.
To investigate the eﬀect of social influence on the number of daily backers, I include first of
all the logarithmic count of attracted audience members, who backed the project before the focal
day. Model 2 shows positive and significant coeﬃcient estimates, demonstrating the eﬀect of social
influence. As the size of attracted audience increases, the more backers will donate the next day.
After controlling for the eﬀect of social influence,I argue that the eﬀect size of project attributes
decrease. The results of Model 2 demonstrate the decrease in many coeﬃcients. The eﬀect size
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of the project goal, the project duration and creator experience dropped. The significant eﬀect
of detailing the possible risks and the eﬀect of typicality disappeared altogether. Introducing the
project in a longer description seem to negatively aﬀect the size of new backers once we control for
peer influence. The significant and positive eﬀect of the use of video clips and oﬃcial websites also
turned into a negative and significant coeﬃcient estimate. Accounting for peer influence does not
aﬀect the negative eﬀect of market competition when we measure it globally, while the negative
eﬀect of local competition disappears.
In Model 3 I include the donated amount in the model to test weather further backers are
influenced in their decision by the previously oﬀered amount or whether they decide based on
the size of the attracted group. The variable has a negative and significant eﬀect on the number
of daily backers, while the eﬀect size of social influence remains similarly strong. This finding
demonstrates that audience members draw conclusions of the attracted group size rather than the
attracted amount. To complement the previous argument, in Model 4 I include another measure
of the size of donation. Namely, I include how much percentage of the target amount is oﬀered
for the project. Once the project starts reaching a higher percentage of the target amount, it will
also become more popular. The eﬀect size of reached target percentage remains behind the eﬀect
size of peer influence, which has the strongest relationship with popularity.
In Model 5 I further investigate the relationship between the increasing social influence and
product attributes. Including a set of interactions, I find that projects with higher targets are less
attractive, the negative eﬀect of which decreases with the increasing social influence.
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Figure 4.4: Interaction between project goal and backer size
Figure 4.4 demonstrates the relationship between the number of daily backers and the project’s
goal amount. Similarly, I find that the negative eﬀect of having a video clip attached to the project
introduction is decreasing with the increasing peer influence. The existence of an oﬃcial website is
generally valued positively by audience members. Although, the coeﬃcient remains positive when
controlling for the the interaction, it’s significance disappears. The eﬀect of having an oﬃcial
website changes with the dynamics of peer influence. As peer influence increases, the positive
eﬀect of the website decreases.
Audience members tend to value shorter projects. Projects with longer duration have a negative
eﬀect on the daily popularity. This negative eﬀect does not change when peer influence becomes
stronger. The interaction term between backer size and project duration is not significant.
On the one hand, the negative eﬀect of increasing global competition decreases as the project
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reaches higher popularity. On the other hand, including the interaction term illuminate the rela-
tionship between local competition and increasing popularity. Increasing local competition may
increase the number of daily backers, but as the popularity increases the positive eﬀect of compe-
tition decreases.
The comparison of the AIC values throughout the models underlines that Model 5 provides the
best fit. Including interaction terms to describe how audience members’ valuations change with
respect to product attributes when popularity increases, improves the model.
4.6 Conclusions
Comparing the results of the backer and project-level analysis I conclude that the results support
the hypotheses. Investigating the diﬀerence between low and high threshold backers I find that low
threshold backers tend to donate to projects with a set of certain attributes, while high threshold
backers diﬀer in their project preferences. To understand this conclusion one has to keep in
mind that the analysis was based on the assumption, that high threshold backers are contributing
towards projects which already gained some level of popularity. This information is inherent in the
fact that high threshold means someone who donated as the xth member in the backing sequence.
Those projects which are a) aiming to raise a relatively small amount of money, b) throughout a
longer period, c) with a shorter description text, d) including a video clip and e) link to the oﬃcial
website, which are f) more typical and which are g) not located in the US are more attractive to
individuals who cannot conclude about the likelihood of the project success from their peers but
they have to rely on the available information on the project attributes. Projects with the above
characteristics tend to gain popularity early on.
The project-level analysis reiterates the previous findings. Projects with similar characteristics
are able to gain higher popularity. Information on the magnitude of the project has a significant
eﬀect on popularity even after controlling for the strength of social influence. Most of the qual-
ity indicators retain their original relationship to popularity when controlling for peer influence,
although their eﬀect size may decrease with the increasing number of attracted audience.
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The general pattern shows that product attributes matter, however their role is changing with
the dynamics of popularity. Individuals still rely predominantly on information on the product
attributes when deciding to contribute to the project early on. Once the project gains some level
of popularity, audience members start to rely more heavily on the project’s current popularity, and
less on the product information. However, there are certain attributes which may circumscribe the
likelihood of project success.
4.7 Discussion
In this paper, I study endogenous audience dynamics. Firstly, I analyze the eﬀect of the prod-
ucts’ objective attributes on the audience valuation and its changes within the dynamics of social
influence. Doing so I build on the concept of threshold model. Secondly, I investigate the conse-
quences of the previous argument on the macro level. I find that audience members value products
diﬀerently when social influence is week in contrast to when social influence is strong. Product
attributes play a more significant role in the latter case. However, I demonstrate that certain
product attributes retain their significant role in audience evaluations in spite of the strong eﬀect
of social influence. The empirical setting is creative projects proposed for crowdfunding on the
Kickstarter website.
There have been studies analyzing the interconnectedness of audience members’ decisions es-
pecially in the herding literature, where scholars analyze network externalities (Katz and Shapiro,
1985), the sanctioning of deviants (Akerlof, 1980) and taste for conformity (Becker, 1991) as
sources of social influence. In the present study audience members are anonymous, therefore the
main reason for following each other’s decision is to infer product quality, which relates to the
information-motivated herding literature (Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani et al., 1992).
Social influence among audience changes the dynamics of the overall producer evaluation. The
pure eﬀect of producer attributes changes as the interpersonal eﬀect strengthens. According to
previous findings, I also find that the dynamics among audience members diminishes the eﬀects
of product attributes (Salganik et al., 2006; Salganik and Watts, 2008; Koning and Model, 2013).
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However my results demonstrate that there are aspects of the product information, which cannot
be overwritten by the eﬀect of social influence. When audience members are provided with the
information on their peers’ behavior, it may lead to a decrease in the predictability of outcomes,
but it does not necessarily lead to complete unpredictability Salganik et al. (2006).
In previous studies of producer appeal, researchers conclude from aggregate results, the eﬀects
of certain producer attributes. The results of aggregate analysis in a setting where the information
on peer decision is present may overestimate the eﬀect size of the pure attribute and disregard the
eﬀect size of social influence. Kovacs and Johnson argue for example that high quality restaurants
may benefit from being atypical members to their categories (Kovacs and Johnson, 2013). They
provide the explanation of attracting customers who are more likely to be novelty seeking. Another
possible explanation could be that the cause behind the positive aggregate eﬀect of atypicality is
the strong eﬀect of social influence.
This paper contributes to the existing literature by demonstrating the applicability of threshold
model in observational data. The theoretical background of the threshold model was created in
the 1970’s with demonstrations of the theory on mathematical simulation models (Schelling, 1971,
1972; Granovetter, 1978). Many more researchers followed earlier practices of using computer
simulations to prove the nonexistence of a correlation between individual incentives and collec-
tive outcomes in diﬀerent situations. Schelling applies threshold model to simulate neighborhood
tipping (Schelling, 1971), Granowetter and Soong illustrate the dynamics of consumer demand
(Granovetter and Soong, 1986) and public opinion (Granovetter and Soong, 1988) while Watts
(2002) simulates global cascades in social and economic systems. One condition of the threshold
model is that decisions are made in sequence, information on which is hard to obtain in real life
data. The Kickstarter website publishes all backers in the order of their contribution, the data
structure of which allows one to track the sequence of decisions. The analysis of more than 6000
projects strongly supports the core idea of the threshold model, that is, prospective contributors
to the project make their decisions heavily based on the number of previous backers.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
5.1 Summaries of chapter results and contributions
The appearance of the internet, and its diﬀusion into many aspects of our daily life brought several
implications to the organizations. The goal of my dissertation was to examine three areas where
audience members’ internet-mediated communication has a direct influence on the organization.
Firstly, I argue that the rapid growth in the use of emails as a channel of communication
provides scholars with easily accessible data, which allows them to map the structure of communi-
ties. However, data from on-line sources does not reflect previously studied “oﬀ-line” relationships
perfectly. I compare oﬀ-line interactions to on-line interactions using exponential random graph
(ERG) models to understand what aspects of the face-to-face communication approximates it’s
on-line counterpart. I analyze the roles of the two diﬀerent communication channels in reflecting
organizational boundaries, organizational hierarchies and gender.
Secondly, studying online reviews written by audience members, I investigate why producers
with multiple categories receive lower ratings from reviewers than their single-category competitors.
In the empirical investigation I directly test and disentangle typicality-based and quality-based
explanations for the negative consequences of category spanning.
Thirdly, I analyze the interconnectedness of audience decisions of an online crowdsourcing
platform. I address the micro level mechanism of how audience behavior creates certain macro level
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patterns of producer success rather than assuming that they are simple aggregates of individual
characteristics. I approach audience members’ behavior from a collective behavioral perspective.
Specifically, I analyze audience dynamics with threshold models.
5.1.1 Chapter 2
People communicating through online channels bring many advantages to research scholars who
study interaction patterns. Relying on online data to map the structure of communities is not
necessarily a straightforward exercise. Researchers now use email networks assuming that it mirrors
communication (or other) networks (e.g., Grippa et al., 2006; Kleinbaum et al., 2008). In Chapter 2
questioning this assumption I investigate how these online connections relate to previous “oﬀ-line”
measures of relationships and networks (Menchik and Tian, 2008; Matzat and Snijders, 2010). In
Chapter 2 I provide an explorative case study, in which I compare the email network of a Central
European Bank’s employees with the corresponding self reported friendship networks, information
networks, and advice networks. The dataset contains attribute information about the employees,
email messages among the employees, and a sociometric survey for a three-week period. Besides
the descriptive analysis of the network, I use exponential random graph (ERG) models to estimate
when and how email networks and networks based on traditional sociometric methods coincide or
diverge.
Chapter 2 has three main contributions to the research field. Firstly, The results of analyzing
multiple operationalizations provides guidance on how a tie should be defined in the email corre-
spondence. Secondly, I diﬀerentiate between three main types of employee connections: friendship,
communication, and advice, in order to better understand the relationship between oﬀ-line and
other types of communication networks. Having a multidimensional measure of social networks
enables us to better understand the extent to which emails correspond to “oﬀ-line” ties. Thirdly,
Chapter 2 demonstrates that although the structure of the email networks in the dataset is related
to the structure of survey-based networks, emails networks and survey-based social networks do
not perfectly correspond to each other. On the one hand, email-based and survey-based social net-
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works do coincide in many aspects. For example, email networks are relatively good in predicting
the betweenness and degree centrality of employees, especially in the advice seeking and commu-
nication networks. In many other aspects, however, email-based and survey-based social networks
diverge. For example, if one is interested in the role organizational boundaries play in forming
social networks, the two data types paint markedly diﬀerent pictures. In the email-based networks,
organizational boundaries play a weaker role (Diehl et al., 2006) and email communication often
moves across boundaries. The sociometric data, however, indicate that these boundaries do play
a role, a role that is much stronger than pictured by email networks. Also, email networks do not
capture the role organizational hierarchies and gender play in interpersonal networks. Further, I
enrich the analysis with detailed attribute data on the network participants and I test previous
results on a larger dataset.
5.1.2 Chapter 3
In Chapter 3, I studied audience members’ on-line reviews and their eﬀect on producer success.
Researchers studying category spanning and it’s consequences to the producer, have put forward
an impressive set of empirical findings over the past decades. I argue that the theoretical under-
pinnings of these findings are not well clarified. The number of diﬀerent theoretical processes have
been advanced to explain the consequences of category spanning which are not directly tested.
The explanations proposed by organizational theorists mainly fall into two areas, which I term the
“quality-based” and the “socio-cognitive-based” explanations.
In Chapter 3 I attempt to test and contrast the mechanisms of the quality-based and socio-
cognitive-based explanations directly in the empirical setting of restaurant reviews.
One of the main novelties of Chapter 3 is a direct instrument of typicality. Previous research
assessed typicality indirectly, and assumed that the more categories an organization populates,
the lower its typicality in each of the categories populated (Negro et al., 2010b; Hsu et al., 2009b;
Kovacs and Hannan, 2011). The empirical strategy to assess the typicality of restaurants is to
contrast the oﬀering of the restaurant (items on the menu) with its labels (Italian, Japanese, etc.)
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and assess the extent to which the menu fits the label(s) the restaurant claims. I use a commonly
utilized computational linguistics approach, word-category co-location mapping (Manning and
Schütze, 1999b), to explore the schemata of organizational categories. I establish the typicality
of the restaurants in the categories by comparing the restaurant’s oﬀering to the schemata of the
categories.
In Chapter 3, I demonstrate that quality mediates the negative average eﬀect of category
spanning on value ratings: lower quality leads to lower ratings and restaurants in multiple categories
on average were conferred lower quality than single-category restaurant. These findings provide a
direct corroboration of the assumption behind the principle of allocation (Hannan and Freeman,
1989a). I also demonstrate the positive relationship between typicality and audience value ratings.
The evidence of the positive average eﬀect of typicality has implication for current research in
organizational authenticity. Carroll and Wheaton (2009b) argue that restaurants that are viewed
as authentic are viewed more favorably by patrons. One of their constructs of authenticity is
type-authenticity: an organization is type-authentic if its attributes and practices are consistent
with its type. This construct is similar to what I call typicality. The findings indicate that type
authenticity should be especially important for low- and mid-quality level restaurants.
5.1.3 Chapter 4
In Chapter 4, I study audience members’ on-line behavior from a collective behavior perspective.
Specifically, I conduct a multi-level investigation on how audience’s evaluation changes with respect
to the increasing level of social influence in the setting of creative projects’ on-line crowdfunding
activity. On the micro-level, I argue that audience members’ value products based on the objective
attributes when the eﬀect of social influence is either small or non-existent. As peer influence get’s
stronger, the eﬀect of product attributes decreases in the valuation process. On the macro-level, I
study the changes of the role of product attributes in social valuation.
While previous studies of producer success mainly drew conclusions on product attributes, a
novelty of Chapter 4 is that I study audience dynamics with threshold models.
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As follows from the threshold theory, I argue that producers’ ability to attract audiences hinges
not solely on the producer’s attributes but also on the social influence already attracted audience
members have on the prospective audience. Accounting for interaction among audience members
provides a more nuanced description of the role of certain producer attributes.
Analyzing more than 5000 projects, I find evidence that audience decisions are interrelated.
The result supports the core idea of the threshold model, that is prospective contributors to the
project make their decisions based on the number of previous investors and the higher the number
of previous investors, the higher the positive influence on the number of investors on the focal
day. The interpersonal eﬀect among audience members have further implications for studies of
producer success. My analysis supports, that the increasing eﬀect of social influence will decrease
the eﬀects of other producer attributes. Specifically, I find that the positive eﬀect of project
typicality on gaining audience (where typicality is measured by the grade of membership of the
project description) is going to decrease as more audience is gained. The positive eﬀect of the
producer’s ability to attract members from the target population diminishes with the increasing
size of audience. I define a producer’s target population as those members of the total audience
whose previous activity is higher than 50% in the given category.
I conclude that social influence among audience changes the dynamics of the overall producer
appeal. In previous studies of producer appeal, researchers derived from aggregate results the
eﬀects of certain producer attributes. The results of aggregate analysis may overestimate the
eﬀect size of the pure attribute and disregard the eﬀect size of social influence. The present
analysis demonstrates that projects with mid-level typicality which are subject to strong social
influence might be more likely to receive the target amount of funding than projects with initial
high typicality but with weaker social influence. This study also demonstrates that product success
highly depends on audience homogeneity. In line with the arguments put forward by population
ecologists and opposite to the sociological arguments, appeal initially to one narrow segment of the
audience will more likely lead to further audience gain. The study also demonstrates that successful
projects were able to attract audience from broader niches. This result helps to understand why
highly typical projects may not be as successful as their less typical rivals claiming that they may
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not be appealing enough to audiences of varied tastes.
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